HomeCategory Article

Instead of Libel, Try Privacy?: Justice Olufunke Sule-Amzat makes history as the High Court of Lagos identifies ‘publication of private embarrasing facts’ as an invasion of privacy under Section 37 of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution

About 7 years ago, I engaged the highly cerebral Folabi Kuti,SAN on a discussion bordering on the technicality of libel suits especially the tricky nature of “reputation” and the potency of justification/truth as a defence. Many cases where the victims’ feelings and emotions have been severely hurt by others’ reckless publications have been lost or won on the defence of truth. Hence, once the author of an allegedly libelous statement can establish truth, then they are let off the hook and the subject of such statements are left in the cold even where such intrusive stories do not benefit the public.   In my ongoing research at the University of Portsmouth, I have discovered that it is the Nigerian Lawyers’ (understandable) widespread fixation on defamation as the only civil cause of action addressing reckless statements that has stunted the growth of other relevant viable causes of action. For context, our jurisprudence on the right to privacy remains so underdeveloped that the courts have (un)consciously declined to expound the law of privacy on some few occasions presenting such opportunities. (See Nwachukwu v Nwachukwu (2018) LPELR–44696 (SC) where the Supreme Court dismissed an alleged invasion of privacy of home as a matrimonial cause; Madu v Neboh (2001) FWLR (Pt. 52) 2271 where a tenant’s claim of invasion of home by the landlord’s reprehensible removal of his roof was squarely dismissed as a tenancy matter etc.    Privacy inherently protects four interests to wit: (a) intrusion upon seclusion (b) appropriation of name or likeness (c) publication of embarrassing private facts (d) publicity in a false light, but the Nigerian judiciary has only had the opportunity to pronounce on two. Publication of embarrassing facts and false lights have never (to my knowledge) been introduced to the Nigerian courts until last year when my Firm attempted altering the status quo by filing some suits on invasion of privacy by publicity in a false light. This privacy interest is violated when a defendant publishes a statement which: (a.) Gives the plaintiff an unwanted publicity  (b.) The publicity is reckless and false (c.) A reasonable person will find it offensive (d.) injurious to self-respect, dignity and individual integrity. Expectedly, two of those suits were dismissed by the same judge who (understandably) expressed bewilderment at the “strange” cause of action thus:   “I do not understand how the applicant and her counsel were able to arrive at the action filed and the arguments canvassed in support of the action. In any event, the action is totally misconceived, and it is lacking in merit and substance…”   There are no existing Nigerian precedents, hence it will take more than the usual “My Lord, it is trite law” arguments to convince a court of first instance to identify such an unused cause of action under the law of privacy given the terse provision of section 37 of the Constitution. Suffice to add that we have gone ahead to appeal the two decisions and we have already filed our appellant’s brief in one of them.   Happily, in Suit No. LD/14893MFHR/2023 between Adewale v Olamilekan, judgment was delivered on the 2nd day of July 2024 when Justice O. Sule-Amzat of the High Court of Lagos State historically ruled that:   “The right to privacy protects an indivudual from the invasion of his/her privacy by anyone., it protects an individual from the public disclosure of embarrassing facts and it also prevents the appropriation of an individual’s name or likeness for commercial use. The kernel of the provision of section 37 is in my considered view, that the privacy of a citizen of Nigeria shall not be violated. It can be said to mean the right to be free from public attention or the right not to have others intrude into one’s private space uninvited or without one’s approval. It means to be able to stay away or apart from others without observation or intrusion.”   In the case, a blogger published a false story about a movie actress’s relationship using her name and and picture. Instead of suing for defamation, we opted for invasion of privacy by publicity in a false light and thereby invited the court to make the pronouncement above.    Conclusion This decision (to the best of my knowledge) represents Nigerian court’s first identification of publication of embarrasing facts as a form of invasion  of privacy. It is hoped that such a progressive decision forms the basis for the further development of our privacy jurisprudence both by lawyers and the judex.

How much do you currently earn in your workplace? Routine Privacy Violations at Job Interviews!

According to the National Bureau of Statistics, employment rate in Nigeria jumped to 5.3% in the first quarter of 2024. Whatever that means in economic parlance, no one wants to be counted as part of the that demography. In our ever-competitive job market, salary negotiations play a pivotal role in filling vacancies from employer and employee perspectives.    Hence, it has become a common practice during the hiring process for prospective employers to ask job applicants about their previous or current salary. Sadly, most applicants are either desperate or helpless enough to answer such questions which could be to their detriment. Beyond the potential for reinforcing wage inequality – a common feature in the Nigerian work space – this question raises serious concerns regarding privacy rights and data protection laws.   Defensively, employers usually argue that knowing a candidate’s past compensation helps them assess whether a candidate fits within their budget. They might also claim it helps them make fair and informed decisions. However, from the applicant’s perspective, such inquisition into their earning capacities can be harmful in a number of ways, a few of these concerns are discussed in the successive paragraphs:   Invasion of financial privacy  A person’s salary and self-esteem are interconnected as they impact the person’s dignity which is the foundation of privacy. When job applicants are asked by prospective employers to disclose their salary history, they are essentially being systemically coerced or unduly influenced to reveal personal financial information. An information they will otherwise prefer to be in private, hence while some lie about the information, others are boxed into revealing the true figures.   Employers often attempt to justify the question as a necessary part of the hiring process, it infringes on an applicant’s right to privacy. Individuals should not be compelled to share details about their finances with potential employers unless it is justifiably related to the job requirements or other essential criteria – in most cases, it is an oppressive tool for the employer. Salary history is a deeply personal matter. It reflects not just an individual’s compensation package but also elements like their personal circumstances, career choices, and possibly even discriminatory pay practices. To be forced to disclose this information can make candidates uncomfortable and may dissuade them from pursuing opportunities altogether.   From a data protection perspective, even where such information is disclosed ‘voluntarily’ by the applicant, such imputed consent cannot be valid considering the imbalance in bargaining power between the parties. On this kind of invalid consent, the English data protection authority (Information Commissioner’s Office – ICO) states thus: “Consent needs to be specific and granular, which means that you must obtain a candidate’s separate consent for each processing activity. Candidates may feel that they have no choice but to give you consent in order to be considered for a job. As there is likely to be an imbalance of power between the candidate and the employer or recruiter, consent is unlikely to be an appropriate lawful basis to use at most stages of the recruitment process.” (see <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/employment/recruitment-and-selection/data-protection-and-recruitment/>)   Propensity for Bias and Wage Inequality  Inquisition into salary history questions are inherently targeted towards perpetuating wage inequality and bias. When recruiters ask  about previous salaries, the results may (un)intentionally lock candidates into lower-paying roles, based on what they earned at previous jobs, even i circumstances where they have grown and become entitled to a higher wages. This question potentially widens the pay gap, particularly for women and the vulnerable minorities, who have historically earned lower wages compared to their male and other privileged counterparts. If prospective employers continue to use salary history as a baseline for setting pay, it risks perpetuating a cycle where underpaid individuals are continuously offered lower salaries. This practice often leaves workers from marginalized groups in a disadvantageous position, perpetuating systemic wage disparities.   Demands of Data Protection laws   Data protection became a statutorily recognized concept in 2023 through the passage of NDPA. The legislation reinforces certain principles of data processing, imposes obligations on employers (as controllers) while guaranteeing employees’ rights (as data subjects).   Admittedly, financial data does not come under the definition of sensitive data, however its processing must be done in accordance with the principles of data processing recognised under section 24 of the NDPA. The first test is measured towards the principle of lawfulness, fairness and transparency. Except the law specifically empowers a prospective employer to ask such questions, there is no lawful ground to make such inquisition. Employers are reasonably expected to have salary scale for every job opening, hence asking an applicant to disclose his current earnings negates such duty or expectation on the employer’s part. Employers can hardly rely on the grounds of contract necessity or consent, since it is the employer that fixes remuneration which may(not) be accepted by the applicants. In ideal situations, employers ought to even give an idea of the salary scale at the time of advertisement of vacancy except other considerations negate such disclosure. As for consent, I have shown earlier that such consent is vitiated as involuntary and unduly obtained by the imbalance in parties’ status.   Let us even assume for a second that the employers have a lawful basis to make such intrusive request, the demand still fails the fairness test. Section 24(1)(a) of the NDPA mandates employers (as controllers) to ensure that they process personal data fairly. In explaining the requirement of fairness, the Nigeria Data Protection Commission states thus: “Fair” means the data processing is free from prejudice and exploitation and it is generally consistent with civil liberties in a democratic society.” (see page 57 of the NDPA General Application and Implementation Directive). Hence, an interview question on salary history will potentially prejudice a job applicant and lead to their exploitation.   Focus ought to be on Skills and Value Rather than focusing on an applicant’s past salary, employers should center their hiring decisions around the skills, experience, and qualifications a candidate brings to the table. Salary...

IMPLIED CONSENT UNDER NDPA-GAID: AN INNOVATIVE CONCEPT OR PROBLEMATIC ILLUSION?

In March 2025, as part of their desire to extra-judicially simplify the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (NDPA), the Nigerian Data Protection Commission (NDPC) issued a document titled the General Application and Implementation Directive (GAID – pronounced as “Guide”) containing explanatory guidance on the provisions of the NDPA. For the budding field of data protection, especially in Nigeria, the GAID ought to come in handy whenever the intention of the draftsmen or the regulator is interrogated. Still, when the provision of article 17(8) of GAID is considered, it is seen that the document does more than a mere explanation of the NDPA – it makes a ‘creation’ of some sort. In the succeeding paragraphs, I analyse my brief opinion on the concept of implied consent under article 17(8) of GAID   Inelegant drafting and logical impossibility   Although a commendable regulatory effort, rather than resolving the ambiguities in the NDPA, some provisions of GAID have created new problems owing to inelegant drafting. For context, article 17(8) provides that: “Nothing in this GAID shall prevent a data subject from giving a constructive or an implied consent to data processing in the following circumstances” (Emphasis mine) Interestingly, the provision above seeks to empower a data subject to “give” implied consent, but the idea is blatantly illogical and contradictory. The word ‘implied’ refers to something that arises by inference or operation of law, even though it is not expressly written or stated, hence, it cannot be ‘given’ by the data subject but inferred from certain facts.   “Giving” consent implies a positive, intentional act i.e something actively done by the person, but in this case, consent is inferred from a passive conduct without expressly stating the specifics. In other words, implied consent is not actively given, it is inferred from behaviour, circumstances, or failure to object. Providing that someone can “give” implied consent mixes two logically inconsistent ideas: one is active (i.e “gave”) and one passive (i.e “implied”). It gives a paradoxical impossibility, like suggesting someone “shouts silently.” The other problem with this provision is the suggestion that, once one attends a public event, the organisers have implied consent that images taken at the event may be used for a report of that event. This provision creates at least two potential problems. First, there is no definition of public event, hence everything is left to conjecture on what nature or type of event constitutes a public event. Secondly, what does a ‘report’ of the event mean? Internal report or publication of the event?    Implied consent is unknown to NDPA   Consent is defined under section 65 of the NDPA as “any freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous indication, whether by a written or oral statement or an affirmative action, of an individual’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or to another individual on whose behalf he has the permission to provide such consent”   The definition above clearly signifies that consent must be “specific” “unambiguous” and by statement or ‘clear’ affirmation, whereas to imply means to suggest or indicate something without saying it directly and this is where the problem lies. While the NDPA prescribes consent to be specific and unambiguous, the GAID subjects the concept to inference, which now makes such consent debatable. In other words, the concept of informed consent is grounded in an assumption based on certain facts and circumstances but it is my respectful opinion that the draftsmen intended consent to be free from conjecture, especially by the use of “specific” and “unambiguous”.    Once parties begin to argue on the validity of consent, then its existence becomes doubtful and problematic, especially since NDPA provides that silence or inactivity does not constitute consent. The activity contemplated here must be such that it indicates the specific processing consented to but not an assumption that the data subject consents to all kinds of processing activities without spelling them out. For example, if a person attends an event where a notice is displayed that the event would be recorded and pictures taken would be used for promotional purposes, do this necessarily cover the subsequent (indefinite) storage and sharing with third-party vendors? This answer is not that straightforward, and that vitiates consent ordinarily.   Contemporary best practice   It is common knowledge that, from a data protection perspective, consent is inherently tricky, slippery and problematic, especially since it must be informed. Hence, once a controller cannot demonstrate that the data subject is duly informed of the specific processing activities they were consenting to, then consent is vitiated. Regardless of the position the NDPC wants to take on implied consent, it is important to consider the contemporary approach to this hydra-headed conundrum.    In 2020, the European Data Protection Board released their Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679. Paragraph 168 of the document states that: “…the GDPR requires that a controller must be able to demonstrate that valid consent was obtained, all presumed consents of which no references are kept will automatically be below the consent standard of the GDPR and will need to be renewed. Likewise as the GDPR requires a “statement or a clear affirmative action”, all presumed consents that were based on a more implied form of action by the data subject (e.g. a pre-ticked opt-in box) will also not be apt to the GDPR standard of consent.” From the provision above, implied consent is not considered valid, especially where the controller is unable to demonstrate such informed consent   On what constitutes valid consent, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office clarifies that: “The idea of an affirmative act does still leave room for implied methods of consent in some circumstances, particularly in more informal offline situations. The key issue is that there must still be a positive action that makes it clear someone is agreeing to the use of their information for a specific and obvious purpose. However, this type of implied method of indicating consent would not extend beyond what was obvious and...

META AND NDPC’S CONSENT JUDGMENT: A BLOW TO NIGERIA’S DATA SOVEREIGNTY AND DISREGARD FOR CITIZENS’ PRIVACY RIGHTS?

Background In February 2025, news of the Nigeria Data Protection Commission’s (NDPC) $32.8 million fine against Meta made headlines. Reactions were mixed: some praised the NDPC for its courage, others questioned the basis of the fine, while sceptics doubted any meaningful outcome would result.   When Meta challenged the fine in court and the NDPC responded, many anticipated a landmark African judgment on data protection. Yet, in an unexpected turn, both parties entered into settlement negotiations. The resulting terms of settlement were later adopted as a consent judgment by the Federal High Court on 3rd November 2025. I recently became interested in the terms of the settlement when a civil society invited me to lead an evidence-based research on accountability of Big Tech companies in Nigeria. Hence, from the certified true copy obtained from the registry of the Federal High Court, the following are my open-minded observations, some of which reveal several troubling implications.   The Final Order Set Aside Clause 9.2 of the terms reproduced as consent judgment states that the NDPC “sets aside the Final Orders against Meta.” This is arguably the most concerning clause. The 58-page Final Order reflects two years of investigation, hearings, and taxpayer-funded proceedings. Yet, the settlement nullifies all that work. Not only does this undermine the NDPC’s investigative efforts, but it also shields Meta from accountability and limits victims’ ability to seek redress.   The Fine Effectively Nullified The terms of settlement and consent judgment do not stipulate any payment from Meta. Clause 9.2 discharges Meta from “all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, contracts, obligations, suits, debts, costs, liabilities.” In effect, the NDPC has no official path to collect the $32.8 million fine, leaving only the possibility of an informal, undisclosed arrangement.   Contradictions Within the Settlement Clause 8 of the settlement outlines obligations for Meta, yet clause 9.2 discharges the company from “obligations.” This contradiction undermines both the optics and enforceability of the agreement, raising questions about the seriousness of Nigeria’s regulatory oversight.   Whistleblower Efforts Undermined The Final Order was issued in response to a petition from a civil society organization. The consent judgment effectively nullifies the outcome of this patriotic whistleblowing effort. The NDPC’s investigation, which followed due process, is rendered meaningless for the whistleblowers and the public.   Meta’s Track Record Abroad NDPC’s fine was not unprecedented globally. Meta has faced over €2.7 billion in GDPR fines in Europe, including a €481 million civil damages order in Spain in 2025 for unfair use of personal data. Yet, unlike in Nigeria, enforcement actions abroad have resulted in tangible penalties. The Nigerian settlement appears to be the first instance where Meta successfully challenged a fine and paid nothing (going by the records).   A First in Africa, But at What Cost? NDPC’s original decision was celebrated as a pioneering move in Africa. However, the settlement undermines that achievement, setting a worrying precedent for regulatory enforcement on the continent.   Implications for Nigeria’s Data Sovereignty By vacating its enforcement decision against Meta, NDPC raises serious concerns about Nigeria’s control over its citizens’ personal data. Data sovereignty relies on the principle that personal data generated within Nigeria remains subject to Nigerian law and oversight. When violations involving cross-border data transfers can be neutralized via settlement, Nigeria’s ability to assert authority over its citizens’ data is weakened. This reinforces the imbalance between Global South regulators and powerful Global North technology companies, reducing Nigeria’s leverage in setting global data standards.   Circumventing Criminal Accountability Section 49 of the Nigeria Data Protection Act (NDPA) makes failure to comply with NDPC orders a criminal offense. Meta’s actions, therefore, constituted a criminal violation. The settlement effectively circumvents this accountability, raising dangerous implications for future regulatory enforcement.   Victims Left Unprotected Ultimately, this episode affects over 60 million Nigerians whose data was misused. With the Final Order set aside, victims remain without redress, undermining the NDPC’s mandate to protect citizens’ privacy.   Double Standards in Enforcement NDPC has successfully fined other entities in Nigeria, who complied with its orders. Meta, however, has been treated differently, creating an unequal enforcement landscape.   Setting a Precedent for Future Violators This consent judgment risks creating a blueprint for multinational companies to evade regulatory penalties in Nigeria, weakening the credibility of the NDPC and the broader regulatory framework.   Conclusion While the NDPC’s original fine against Meta represented a bold step for data protection in Africa, the subsequent consent judgment has diminished its impact. By vacating the Final Order and discharging Meta from all claims and obligations, Nigeria has compromised its data sovereignty, undermined whistleblowers, and left millions of citizens without recourse. This episode highlights the urgent need for stronger, consistent enforcement mechanisms to ensure that multinational technology companies are held accountable in Nigeria.  

Hon. Tajudeen Abbas’s Mandatory Voting Bill and Constitutional Privacy in Nigeria

In February 2025, the Speaker of the House of Representatives sponsored a bill titled the “Bill for an Act to Amend the Electoral Act 2022 to Make It Mandatory for All Nigerians of Majority Age to Vote in All National and State Elections and for Related Matters.” The bill proposes imposing a maximum of six months imprisonment or a fine of no more than N100,000 for Nigerians of voting age who fail to vote during elections. While the bill aims to address voter apathy and enhance electoral participation, it raises significant concerns regarding its potential infringement on citizens’ fundamental rights—specifically the right to privacy under Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. Constitutional privacy and voting Section 37 of the Nigerian Constitution guarantees the privacy of citizens and provides a safeguard against arbitrary intrusions into personal choices and activities. The provision states: “The privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraphic communications is hereby guaranteed and protected.” This provision has been interpreted to mean that individuals have the right to make personal decisions in private, free from public interference. It encompasses not only decisions about one’s personal and family life but extends to decisions about political participation, such as whether to vote or whom to vote for during elections. The right to vote is undoubtedly a fundamental democratic right, but voting itself is not mandatory under Nigerian law. Currently, while every Nigerian citizen of voting age has the right to vote, there is no compelling legal obligation to do so. Voting, therefore, remains a choice — one that is meant to be freely exercised, without coercion or compulsion. Caselaw on decision to vote and choice of candidate In 2014, the Court of Appeal in the landmark case of Nwali v. Ebonyi State Independent Electoral Commission (EBSIEC) & Ors (2014) LPELR-23682(CA) provided a robust interpretation of the right to privacy in the context of voting. The court held that the phrase ‘privacy of citizens’ includes not just the choice of who to vote for, but also the decision to vote itself. The court emphasized that citizens are entitled to the privacy of their decision to vote or not to vote for any candidate of their choice. Hence, forcing someone to vote, or compelling them to publicly declare their choice, would infringe upon their privacy rights. In this case, the appellant had challenged the public display of voting choices, arguing that such actions intruded upon his privacy. The court ruled in his favor, affirming that the compulsion to vote publicly or the intrusion into the privacy of one’s voting decision violates the fundamental right to privacy guaranteed under Section 37 of the Constitution. The court opined: “The privacy of his choice of that candidate and the privacy of his voting for that candidate constitute part of his ‘privacy’ as a citizen. The appellant was entitled to the privacy of his decision to vote for a particular candidate, his choice of that candidate and his casting his vote for that candidate. Therefore, requiring or compelling him to vote openly in the public watch and knowledge by queuing in front of the poster carrying the portrait of the candidate he has decided to vote for intrudes into, interferes with, and invades the privacy of his said decision, choice and voting, completely removing that privacy, therefore amounting to a clear violation of his fundamental right to the privacy of a citizen.” Analysis of the Proposed Bill The bill, which seeks to make voting mandatory for all Nigerians of voting age, is therefore directly at odds with ‘privacy of citizens’ as interpreted in the Nwali v. EBSIEC case. The bill proposes punitive measures—imprisonment or a fine—for citizens who fail to vote. While the objective of increasing voter turnout and participation in elections is commendable, compelling citizens to vote could be seen as an infringement on their personal autonomy and right to privacy. The decision to vote, and by extension the choice of candidate, forms an essential part of a citizen’s personal freedom and privacy. Compelling individuals to vote, particularly under the threat of imprisonment or financial penalty, undermines this right by forcing citizens to participate in an election against their will. As stated by the Court of Appeal, such a compulsion would effectively strip away the privacy of a citizen’s choice, forcing them into the public sphere and removing the privacy that ought to accompany their decision. International Precedents and the Nigerian Context While several countries, including Australia and Belgium, have implemented compulsory voting laws, it is crucial to note that these nations do not have the same constitutional framework on the right to privacy as Nigeria. In Australia, for instance, there is no constitutional right to privacy even though there exists ‘patch work’ legislation that references privacy e.g the Privacy Act of 1988. Furthermore, in these jurisdictions, the right to vote is not as strongly protected under constitutional privacy provisions as it is in Nigeria. Therefore, applying such models to Nigeria without proper constitutional alignment could lead to legal conflicts. The Nigerian Constitution expressly guarantees a right to privacy, which the proposed bill may unduly infringe upon. Moreover, Nigerian courts have upheld privacy of citizens’ in the context of voting as seen in Nwali v. EBSIEC. The case serves as a reminder that the Constitution protects not only individuals’ rights to make choices about their lives but also extends this protection to the realm of political participation, including the decision not to vote. Conclusion While the proposed bill may be driven by noble intentions to encourage greater voter participation, it risks undermining the fundamental rights of Nigerian citizens as guaranteed by section 37 of the 1999 Constitution. Mandatory voting, under threat of punishment, infringes upon the privacy of citizens, as it compels them to exercise a right that is meant to be voluntary. The right to vote, like any other fundamental right, should remain a personal choice and not be subject to coercion or penalty. As such, any attempt to make...

The Constitutional Right to Fair Hearing is not ‘Beautiful For All Situations’ says the Supreme Court in Emeka v Okorafor (2017) LPELR – 41738(SC)

My topic is inspired by King David in the Bible where he sings praises of Mount Zion ‘as beautiful for situation and the joy of the whole earth.’ (see Psalm 48:2 King James Version). Among legal practitioners in Nigeria, even though, we are quick to wield the constitutional right to fair hearing as a magic wand in all situations where a victim is sanctioned without an opportunity to be heard, since 2017, the Supreme Court had ruled that section 36(1) of the Constitution is not applicable in all situations of denial of hearing. Undeniably, so much has been written about the right to fair hearing, but this article is confined to the Supreme Court’s decision in Emeka v Okorafor (2017) LPELR – 41738(SC) on fora where section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution becomes impotent. Facts of the case In 2013, Prof. Paul Emeka – the General Superintendent of Assemblies of God Church was accused of corruption and breach of the Church’s constitution in a petition. In response to the petition, Emeka sent a letter to the executive committee (exco) denying the allegations pursuant to which he received a vote of confidence from pastors and other church members. Some members of the exco were not pleased with him and they convened another meeting to deliberate on the allegations but Prof. Emeka refused to attend on the ground of non-compliance with church regulations. When some officers who attended the meeting suspended Emeka from church and terminated his appointment as the General Superintendent, he filed an action challenging his dismissal for denial of fair hearing under section 36 of the Constitution among other grounds. The relevant portion of the decision In resolving Prof. Emeka’s allegation of denial of fair hearing by the committee, the Supreme Court interestingly ruled that: “A cursory look at reliefs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7 claimed by the appellant at the trial reveals that he claims therein ancillary reliefs, i.e. violation of his right to fair hearing guaranteed by Section 36(1) of the Constitution (as amended), in relation to his right to employment or appointment in the Church, a private organization. The charge is not against a Court or tribunal established by law, but against a committee of a Church, a domestic tribunal. it is only when there has been an alleged violation of the right to fair hearing guaranteed by Section 36(1) of the Constitution by a Court or Tribunal established by law that such right to fair hearing can be enforced under the FREPR.” (Emphasis mine) My brief comments The decision above is clear to the extent that fair hearing under section 36(1) of the Constitution is not applicable to all dispute-resolving bodies or entities. For the avoidance of doubt, the section expressly provides that: In the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality. (Emphasis mine) Since the provision above is fixated on courts or tribunals established by law, it is advisable that, in challenging the decisions or omissions of other entities not covered by this provision, reliance should be placed on relevant provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights or other enactments on fair hearing. Conclusively, the decision under review has once again exposed the inelegant drafting that plagues the 1999 Constitution and the urgent need for reviews as far as fundamental rights are concerned.

Like Nigerian Bobrisky, Like South African Mapodile, Can Nigerian Prisoners Claim Reasonable Expectation of (Bodily) Privacy?

When sometime in 2022, I read the South African decision in Tumelo Mapodile v The Minister of Correctional Services (2016) ZAGPJHC 174, it dawned on me that, sooner than later, the Nigerian Correctional facilities would have a similar issue on their hands. That day has come! It is no longer news that on the 12th day of April 2024, the Nigerian cross-dresser, Idris Okuneye (Bobrisky) was sentenced to 6-months imprisonment for abusing the Nigerian currency. His sentence has been discussed from many perspectives but the part that caught my attention was the news report attributed to the Nigerian Correctional Service (NCS) that they will hold Bobrisky in a male correctional facility and “protect him from sexual predators”. In other words, the NCS has undertaken to protect Bobrisky’s privacy (bodily integrity) while in their custody. I will come back to this. Facts of Mapodile’s case Tumelo, a gay South African, was convicted and imprisoned in a male correctional centre. His fellow inmates considered him a female and repeatedly harassed him sexually. When he consequently wrote a letter to the prison authorities to put him in a solitary cell or together with people of similar sexual orientation, but his request was not acceded to, he approached the court for redress. In granting his application, the South African High Court (Gauteng division) per Mabesele, J held that: “Gays who are in custody are part of the community of prisoners which include categories of prisoners mentioned in regulations and whose right to dignity, to privacy and to health care are protected due to their peculiar status. It is beyond debate that gays, too, have their own peculiar status. Therefore they are entitled to the same protection which is afforded to the categories of prisoners mentioned above. Such protection should not be limited to dignity and privacy but should include equality.” The decision above must however be understood, distinguished or (un)appreciated in the light of South Africa’s pro-homosexuality laws and jurisprudence. For context, in other decisions, the South African courts have peculiarly recognised gay rights and decriminalised homosexuality in deference to the right to privacy. (See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (1999) ZACC 17) Bobrisky’s case and the privacy angle In Nigeria’s case, homosexuality remains a crime the last time I checked but that is not the crux of my intervention especially since Bobrisky was reported to have confirmed to the court that, he is male. Perhaps, the court and NCS were concerned for his sexual safety, hence the confirmation that he would be protected from sexual predators while in custody. First, it is beyond doubt that a convicted person or a prisoner does not automatically lose his/her entitlement to the enjoyment of other fundamental rights apart from personal liberty, freedom of movement etc. As far as a prisoner’s privacy is concerned, even though it is extremely curtailed, it is not entirely eroded. Even though it is superficially contradictory for a prisoner to claim privacy, it is only when one views the right to privacy from a narrow prism that one concludes that prisoners lose the entirety of their privacy upon detention. For context, despite the terse jurisprudence on privacy in Nigeria, the Supreme Court has defined the right to privacy to imply “a right to protect … one’s body from unauthorised invasion”. (see M.D.P.D.T. v. Okonkwo (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 206). During his six-month’s term, Bobrisky still retains the right to protect his body from unauthorised sexual invasion which may await him from some sex-starved male prisoners if he is not protected by the authorities given his contradictory antecedents on social media depicting himself as a woman. While the State can validly intrude on prisoners’ privacy, the latter should enjoy a reasonable measure of bodily privacy from their fellow inmates, and they ought to be able to control how they are perceived by others – this is an interest protected by the right to privacy. Sebastian Hon, SAN notes that private life includes “The physical integrity of a person” and “the right to establish one’s details of identity as an individual human being” (see page 536-537 of S.T. Hon’s Constitutional and Migration Law in Nigeria published in 2016). Bobrisky has openly identified as a man in court, for the sanctity of his bodily privacy, the NCS’s decision to protect him from sexual predators is commendable and aligns with the constitutional provision that guarantees the privacy of citizens. Conclusion Imprisonment does not entirely extinguish all forms of the right to privacy. The Court of Appeal in Nwali v EBSIEC (2014) LPELR–23682(CA) interpreted ‘privacy of citizens’ to include: “citizens’ body… (including his plans and choices)… health…activities etc”. Hence, since Bobrisky is a Nigerian citizen, the respect for his privacy guaranteed under section 37 of the Constitution includes the protection of his body from sexual predators especially since he is more vulnerable as a result of his choices on social media and in life.

Service at the “Last Known Address” – A Concept Taken for Granted in Nigerian Courts? A Brief Peep into the Decision of the High Court of Lagos State in Adigun v Thisday Newspaper (unreported Suit No. ID/ADR/1549/2020)

When a practice goes on for too long unchallenged or uninterrogated, it usually becomes an accepted practice. Such is the default acceptance of service at the ‘last known address’ in the Nigerian courts’ civil procedure. My cursory search has not revealed any appellate court decision where this concept has been interrogated or comprehensively analysed but the High Court of Lagos State was presented with an opportunity to rule on the propriety of service effected at a purported ‘last known address’ in the unreported decision of the High Court of Lagos State in Suit No. ID/ADR/1549/2020 between Adigun and Thisday Newspaper & Anor. Brief facts In the case, a freelance journalist published an allegedly libellous story in Thisday Newspaper about the Claimant who consequently sued the newspaper and joined the journalist as the second defendant in a suit filed in 2020. After serving Thisday at their head office in Apapa, the Claimant applied to the court to serve the journalist by substituted means at Thisday’s office in Apapa deposing to an affidavit that the address was the journalist’s last known address. The case continued for four years without the journalist’s (instructed) participation but in January 2024, the journalist got wind of the suit and he immediately filed an objection on the ground that he was never served with the court papers because Thisday’s office was never his (known) address not to talk of being his last known address. Court decision In resolving the objection squarely on evidence of ‘last known address’, Hon. Justice Y.G. Oshoala copiously ruled that: “Now, the 2nd Defendant/Applicant has asserted that his last known address is not never at No. 35 Creek road, Apapa, Lagos at any time and that he therefore had no notice of the suit, nor was he served with the process….It is also settled in law that there is no doubt that the law provides for a Defendant to be served by substituted means. However the law provides guidelines for when and how this may be done. Where the whereabouts of the Defendant is known and there is no proof that such Defendant is evading service, there is no need for substituted service…. In the instant case, the claim of the Defendant is that the address on which substituted service was served was never and not his last known address of the 2nd Defendant/Applicant. This fact was not contested by the Claimant/Respondent. The further claim of the Applicant is that the processes, having not been served on him or his last known address, he had no notice of the originating process. This I see as logical because the law will not demand impossibility… The question now is that where the 2nd Defendant claimed that he never used or known to be at 35 Creek Road, Apapa, Lagos and that 35 Creek Road Apapa address where service of the process were effected belonged to the 1st Defendant…Can it be said that the substituted service achieved its aim from the time of service until 11th January 2024 when the 2nd Defendant claimed to become aware of it. To my mind the answer cannot be in the positive. It is thus clear that the order of court as to substituted service in this instant was based on wrong fact, misinformation and mistake.” Upon the above finding, the court consequently set aside the service at the purported ‘last known address.’ Conclusion Usually, when an application is brought to serve an adverse party at their last known address, such orders are often-times-than-not granted as a matter of course without strict request for evidence fixing such a defendant to the address. In this case, parties could not rely on any Nigerian authority on the concept of ‘last known address’ as there is (little or) none on the issue but the court was invited to be persuaded by the English decision in Cranfield v BridgeGrove Limited [2003] 3 All ER 129, where the Court of Appeal held that: “The issue that arises in Smith is the meaning of “usual or last known residence”, being the place for service of an individual where no solicitor is acting for the party to be served, and the party has not given an address for service (para 17)…It seems that there is some doubt as to the meaning and effect of CPR 6.5(6) where service is effected on an individual at his last known residence… In particular, is the rule concerned with the claimant’s actual knowledge, or is it directed at the knowledge which, exercising reasonable diligence, he or she could acquire? We incline to the latter view.” Conclusively, Claimants who seek to serve at a ‘last known address’ are expected to do more than state such address in the affidavit must to give further evidence of reasonable diligence exercised in ascertaining that such an address is actually the Defendant’s last known address.

Juvenile #EndBadGovernance# Protesters, Data Accuracy and the Consequences of a Weak Data Protection Framework

On the 1st day of November 2024, the Nigerian social media space was greeted with sympathy-drawing, emotion-laden still and motion images of some Nigerian children (irrespective of their ages, they are still children to their parents) arraigned before the Federal High Court after about 80 days in detention. When one of them slumped from alleged symptoms of malnourishment and hunger, his age and competence to face trial became an issue so much that a leading counsel in the prosecution team openly declared that the defendants are not minors and that most of them are already married with children. The extrajudicial vituperations from the public and counter-assertions from the prosecution raise a data protection issue around the accuracy of personal data – the defendants’ accurate ages as well as the prosecution’s statutory obligation as a data controller. I will briefly discuss this in the successive paragraphs, but it must be quickly reiterated that criminal prosecutions are not wholly exempted from the coverage of the Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023. For clarity, the exemption does not obliterate law enforcement agencies’ obligation to comply with principles of data protection (see section 3(2)(a) NDPA, which clearly “excludes” principles from the exemptions. Data accuracy in the context of the prosecution’s position Accuracy – a cardinal principle of data protection imposes a duty on data controllers to ensure that personal data they process (i.e collect, use, store, share etc) are accurate and kept up to date. The Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (NDPA) specifically requests that such data must not be misleading (see section 24(1)(e). In the case at hand, the police and prosecution are the data controllers who are mandated to ensure that the defendants’ personal data collected and used for their prosecution are accurate and not misleading. The prosecution team announced to the entire world that the defendants are not minors but a look at the charge sheet says otherwise. For the avoidance of doubt, on the charge sheet with number FHC/ABJ/CR/503/2024, Umar Musa is 15; Muhammadu Mustapha 16; Ibrahim Rabiu 16; Muhammed Musa 14 etc. Since these are the recorded ages of some of the defendants, then the prosecution’s position is misleading since these are still minors under Nigerian law.  Verification of Children’s data Going by the recorded ages on the charge sheet, some of these defendants are still minors while others are not thereby raising another data protection query – How did the Police ascertain their ages? The NDPA mandates controllers to be circumspect when processing children’s data. The law requires controllers to apply appropriate mechanism to verify the ages of children before processing their data. (See section 31(2).  In the decision in Emen Akpan v The State (1999) LPELR (CA), the Court of Appeal reiterated the methods of verifying a defendant’s age including: birth certificate or other direct evidence as to the date of birth, and in the absence of such evidence, a certificate signed by a medical officer in the service of the Government giving his opinion as to such age. In this case, the prosecution has curiously fixed the ages of the children without any identifiable mechanism for verifying their ages – this comes with a barrage of privacy and data protection consequences. Consequence of inaccurate data The prosecution’s careless and somewhat erroneous arrogation of inaccurate ages to the defendants has many legal implications touching on the latter’s rights, freedom, mode of trial, safeguards and other entitlements. For the sake of argument, assuming the ages of all defendants are rightly recorded as minors, then the choice of court ought to be different i.e they should all have been charged at the juvenile court. Perhaps, they would not also have been remanded in the regular prisons. Ultimately, they would not also be subjected to full trial of the offence alleged. In conclusion, the failure of the police to verify the ages of children arraigned in court underscores a critical gap in Nigeria’s data protection framework. This lapse can be directly linked to the systemic issues plaguing the Nigeria Data Protection Commission, including inadequate funding, the prolonged omission to appoint governing council members, and the lack of harmonization among the various data registries in the country. These deficiencies not only hinder the effective enforcement of data protection laws but also compromise the rights and welfare of vulnerable populations, particularly children. To address these challenges, it is imperative for the government to prioritize the funding and operationalization of the data protection regulator, ensuring that it can independently and effectively oversee compliance and promote a culture of accountability in data management practices. Without these foundational steps, the integrity of the judicial process and the protection of citizens’ rights remain at significant risk.

ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE OF COURT PROCESS: AN OPEN LETTER TO THE CHIEF REGISTRAR, HIGH COURT OF LAGOS STATE

Ahead of other courts, the High Court of Lagos State had acquired the bragging rights as the progenitor of e-filing in the Nigerian judiciary. However, many lawyers have argued that e-filing remains a mirage in Lagos State but that is not why I am here. In 2022, the Hon. Chief Judge – Justice Kazeem Alogba commendably took things further by approving digital oath-taking and thereby dispensing with the erstwhile physical visits of deponents to the court registry. Interestingly, in 2023, the Evidence Act was amended to accommodate electronic signing of documents. Section 84(C) provides that: “A person may authenticate any electronic record by such digital signature or electronic authentication technique.” While in the interpretation section ‘electronic signature’ is defined as: “authentication of any electronic record by a subscriber by means of the electronic technique specified in the Second Schedule and includes digital signature.” In January 2024, on the heels of all these legal innovations, from my office in Manchester, I appended my digital signature to a court process, emailed it to our litigation clerk and instructed him to file at the registry of the High Court, Lagos division. Alas!, the process was rejected for filing because, according to the court official, my signature was “scanned” hence the process could not be accepted for filing. Following this development, I wrote a letter dated 26th January 2024 to the Chief Registrar seeking clarification but the acknowledged letter remains unreplied up till the time of this open letter. While the court official concerned may be forgiven for not updating his/her knowledge of the law, the Chief Registrar may not enjoy the same sentiment since the occupant is not only deemed to be learned, but the office is also a statutory one invested with wide powers to ease administration of justice according to the extant laws of the land. Even before the amendment of the Evidence Act, the Court of Appeal had defined a person’s signature as “Any name, mark or writing used with the intention of authenticating a document” so if a counsel chooses to use a digital mark, I think the court should respect same until the contrary is proved. (See The Vessel MV Naval Gent v Associated Commodity Int’l Ltd (2015) LPELR-25973(CA) Conclusively, to avoid unnecessary arguments at the court’s registry over the propriety of the electronic signing of court papers, it is my respectful advice that the learned Chief Registrar informs the registry staff of the current position of the law so they can also join the technology transition that our law now enables. God Bless the Nigerian judiciary!  

https://oblp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/oblp-logo-mini-no-back.png

Olumide Babalola LP is a distinguished full-service Law Firm committed to providing exceptional legal solutions with tact, professionalism, and unwavering dedication. As your trusted legal partner, we take pride in our rich history of delivering top-notch services to a diverse clientele, including individuals, corporations, and public bodies within and beyond Nigeria.

Copyright © Olumide Babalola LP 2025 

Aggey House, (6th Floor) 12 Berkeley Street, Moloney, Lagos Island, Lagos State, Nigeria.
+234 916 126 3105
+234 701 626 4434
counsel@oblp.org

Follow us: