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Does the Nigerian Constitution expressly provide for a ‘right to private and family life’? Re-interrogating the effect of the marginal note in section 37.

It has been repeatedly argued that the 1999 Constitution guarantees the right to private and family life. Many lawyers have made this submission within and outside the courtrooms and most judgments on the right to privacy are replete with such conclusion to the extent that, it has now been taken for granted even in the academia. For example, till date, the most widely cited scholarly article on right to privacy in Nigeria was written by the very respected Prof. Enyinna S. Nwauche (Chair of Coordinating Committee of the African Network of Constitutional Lawyers (ANCL), wherein the learned don asserted: “Moreover, the inclusion of the right to private and family life in the Bill of Rights can be said to represent a conviction that, this a right worth protecting for Nigerians … the phrase ‘private life’ a phrase that occurs in both article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and section 37 of the Nigerian Constitution…” (See ES Nwauche, ‘Right to Privacy in Nigeria’ (2007) 1(1) CALS Review of Nigerian Law and Practice, 64 and 69). For the avoidance of doubt, the phrase ‘right to private and family life’ is used twice in the 1999 Constitution: first, in the table of contents and then in the marginal note to section 37 which itself provides that: “The privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications is hereby guaranteed and protected.” It must be noted that, this provision is a replica of section 34 of the 1979 Constitution but a substantial departure from the provisions in the 1960 and 63 Constitutions which mirrored article 8 of the European Convention on Human Right (ECHR) by including ‘private and family life’ in the body of their texts. Like the ECHR, sections 22(1) and 23(1) of both Constitutions provide that: “Every person shall be entitled to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondences.” It however remains unclear why the draftsmen decided to expunge the phrase from the body of the 1999 Constitution only to merely retain same in the table of contents and marginal notes with far reaching constitutional consequences as considered hereunder.   On the legal effect of marginal notes in interpretation of statutes As far back as 1982, the Supreme Court had admonished in the case of Uwaifo v Attorney General of Bendel State (1982) LPELR-3445(SC) that, marginal notes (explanatory or side notes) are to be ignored as mere aids in construing provisions of statutes and they do not control the language of such statutes. The same court was emphatic in Akintokun v LPDC (2014) LPELR-22941(SC) that, they do not form part of statutes and are only for convenience or reference. See also the Yabugbe v C.O.P. (1992) LPELR 3505(SC) and Oloyo v Alegbe (1982) SCNLR 35 at 57 where Eso, JSC (Of blessed memory) noted that, marginal notes do not offer legitimate aid to construction of statutes.   On the strength of the foregoing apex court decisions, it is my respectful opinion that, since the ‘right to private and family life’ is merely a marginal note in the 1999 Constitution, then it is safe to say that, it does not form part of the rights guaranteed under chapter 4 and specifically section 37 of the same constitution. Hence, Nigerian citizens are not expressly offered protection for right to private and family life since the body of the extant 1999 Constitution does not recognise same.   Does section 37 cover private and family life? In the event that, privacy advocates or professionals, one of whom I am, argue that, the provision of section 37 as enacted envisages right to private and family life, it becomes imperative to briefly consider the connotation of that concept. It must however be preliminarily noted that the ‘private and family life’ is a borrowed concept from Europe. It is unknown to English Bills of Rights 1689, Common law, Equity or statutes of general application. Article 8 of the ECHR provides that: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life …”    The European Court of Human Right (ECtHR) while defining or describing private and family life admitted that, it is a broad concept and incapable of precise definition as it may combine ‘multiple aspects of the person’s physical and social identity’ (See S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, Niemietz v. Germany, 29; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 61; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 57)    It has been argued that, right to private and family life is broader and wider than privacy, which most times, relates to an individual’s personal autonomy and control of use of his personal information as opposed to the former that is not limited to an individual’s ‘inner circle’ but includes right that presupposes the existence of a family relationship and protects same. This right is not expressed on the face of section 37 except it is read or implied into it. I am however not unmindful of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Nwali v EBSIEC (2014) LPELR-23682(CA) where ‘privacy of citizens’ was happily given an elastic meaning to cover a citizen’s relationships, but it is my modest opinion that such a progressive intervention still did not expressly import ‘family life’ into the provision considering the meaning of the phrase since not all relationships are necessarily familial.   The ECtHR addressed ‘family life’ in Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy (no. 25358/12 delivered 24 January 2017) thus: “The existence or non-existence of “family life” is essentially a question of fact depending upon the existence of close personal ties… The notion of “family” in Article 8 concerns marriage-based relationships, and also other de facto “family ties” where the parties are living together outside marriage or where other factors demonstrated that the relationship had sufficient constancy …The provisions of Article 8 do not guarantee either the right to found a family or the right to adopt. The right to respect for “family life” does not safeguard the mere desire to found a family; it presupposes...

Divorce cases and the unnecessary disclosure of embarrassing private facts: A passionate appeal to Nigerian lawyers to stem this socially destructive tide

Divorce is an inherently painful and emotional process, often complicated by the disclosure of deeply personal and sometimes embarrassing private information. However, in Nigerian divorce cases, the disclosure of sensitive personal details often goes beyond what is necessary for the fair adjudication of the matter, damaging the dignity and privacy of the individuals involved, and by extension, their families. This practice, which is often done under the guise of pleadings, not only harms those directly involved in the case but also perpetuates social stigmas and exacerbates the already high rate of divorce-related trauma in Nigerian society. As members of the legal profession, Nigerian lawyers have a profound ethical responsibility to balance the pursuit of justice with respect for privacy, decency, and human dignity. Unfortunately, in many cases, sensitive information that is irrelevant to the resolution of a divorce is unnecessarily disclosed, causing significant harm to the parties (and their dependants) involved. This article seeks to examine this growing concern and calls for a conscientious effort from Nigerian lawyers to prevent the socially destructive consequences of such practices. Statutory marriages, like every other contractual relationship may/can end as amicably as reasonable without vendetta, mudslinging, intimidation or character-assassination. Happily, the Matrimonial Causes Act provides for instances where marriages can be dissolved by the courts without apportioning blames to either party. i.e where both parties have lived apart for a period of two or three years. Hence, parties to a divorce petition do not necessarily need to divulge gory details of their disagreement especially since court papers are public documents that can be accessed by innumerable number of persons. The Legal and Ethical Obligations of Lawyers Nigerian lawyers are bound by the ethical guidelines of their profession, which emphasize the duty to protect the confidentiality and dignity of their clients. The Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners in Nigeria clearly outline that lawyers must avoid unnecessary disclosure of confidential information and must act in a manner that protects the integrity of the judicial process. The challenge, however, arises when lawyers prioritize winning cases over protecting the well-being of their clients. Some practitioners may be inclined to use personal information strategically to gain an advantage in a case, without considering the long-term consequences for their clients. In such instances, the interests of the lawyer may conflict with the ethical duties to their clients and society. A lawyer ought to advise clients against the use of personal or embarrassing details about the client’s private and family life as ammunition for scoring a point in court. Such actions undermine the trust and confidentiality inherent in the lawyer-client relationship, erode public confidence in the legal system, and, most importantly, contribute to the broader social stigma surrounding divorce. Privacy concerns I recently read a divorce case where the petitioner was vindictive enough to disclose the HIV-status of his spouse even when that was not the fact relied on for the divorce. Admittedly, Nigeria’s privacy jurisprudence has not developed to the extent of reprimanding and redressing such unnecessary privacy invasion in court proceedings, there however exists foreign authorities for such claims. In L.L. v. France (Application no. 7508/02) a woman filed divorce petition and, in a bid, to win sole custody of the child of the marriage, she fraudulently obtained the husband’s medical record showing he was an alcoholic. When the husband challenged the tendering and use of his medical records as an unjustifiable invasion of his privacy, the European Court of Human Rights held that “In reality, it was only on an alternative and secondary basis that the domestic courts used the disputed medical document in justifying their decisions, and it thus appears that they could have declared it inadmissible and still reached the same conclusion. In other words, the impugned interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life, in view of the fundamental importance of the protection of personal data, was not proportionate to the aim pursued and was therefore not “necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” The court ultimately determined that while the disclosure of the applicant’s medical record during the proceedings was in accordance with established procedural law and aimed at protecting the wife’s rights and freedoms, it was ultimately unjustified. This was because the medical records were not essential to the case and did not play a decisive role in the proceedings. Where a party divulge private facts that are unnecessary to the issues in a case, a privacy suit can lie against such a party and section 45 of the Constitution may not offer any defence except such disclosure is required, necessary or backed by law. Data protection dictates Court proceedings are not immune or exempted from data protection obligations. Section 3(2)(e) of the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (NDPA) only exempts processions that are necessary to establish legal claims. The test of necessity of a certain processing activity is found in proportionality and reasonableness. The Nigeria Data Protection Commission clarifies that, the necessity of processing of personal data must be determined from the risks and availability alternatives to such processing. (see page 27 of the General Application and Implementation Directive of the NDPA). For divorce cases, parties should ensure that the facts disclosed or evidence used do not portend unusual privacy risks to the other parties especially where there are alternatives to the disclosure of such private facts. Conclusion Divorce is a painful process that should not be compounded by unnecessary public humiliation. Nigerian lawyers are in a unique position to play a crucial role in reducing the harm caused by embarrassing disclosures in divorce cases. By adhering to ethical standards, advocating for privacy, and considering the long-term consequences of their actions, Nigerian lawyers can contribute to a legal system that is fair, compassionate, and just. This is a passionate appeal to all Nigerian lawyers to uphold the principles of privacy and dignity, both in the courtroom and in society, and to protect the individuals they represent from...

Reversal of Erroneous Bank Transfers: Are the Customary Courts Now Grabbing the Magistrates and High Courts’ Jurisdiction? A Passionate Call to the Chief Judges to stem this dangerous tide of jurisdictional Usurpation

In January 2025, when a financial institution was threatened with contempt proceedings and garnishee proceedings for their alleged failure to comply with an order of a Customary Court sitting in Oyo State, we were briefed to enter appearance, and I had to personally attend the court to contain the situation. The journey was about 40 minutes out of Ibadan to a remote village or town known as “Iroko.” On a lighter note, Google map could not even take me there, navigation satellite rather suggested Iroko TV. It was my first appearance at a Customary court – an unfamiliar terrain and under unimagined circumstances – Garnishee proceedings bearing threatened contempt proceedings against our client. Happily, I was able to get the client discharged but the demeanour of the learned judges confirmed to me that such proceedings might have become a staple cause in their courts. These courts are historically and primarily tasked with resolving issues related to land disputes, succession, inheritance, and matrimonial causes based on customary law as they have become an integral part of the country’s judicial structure. However, a troubling trend has emerged in recent years: cases involving erroneous bank transfers are being litigated in these same courts, raising serious questions about the boundaries of their jurisdiction and the proper application of the law. Customary Courts and Their Limited Jurisdiction The jurisdiction of customary courts in Nigeria is clearly defined and confined to matters relating to native law and custom. Disputes involving land ownership, inheritance rights, and matrimonial issues are the bread and butter of customary courts, as these matters are deeply connected to the social fabric and traditions of local communities. However, an emerging and concerning phenomenon has seen matters unrelated to customary law, such as disputes over erroneous bank transfers, being brought before these courts. Such disputes are often based on banking services, torts of negligence, or breaches of contract—none of which fall within the scope of native law or custom. These cases, rooted in modern financial transactions and contract law, do not have the cultural or traditional relevance that would justify their adjudication by customary courts. Jurisdictional Conflict: The Case of Erroneous Bank Transfers Erroneous bank transfers typically arise when funds are transferred in error from one bank customer’s account to another, often due to clerical mistakes or technological glitches. The legal remedy for such issues typically lies in contract law, tort law, or consumer protection statutes, and the proper venue for these cases is a court with general jurisdiction over civil matters, such as a High Court or a Magistrates Court. Customary courts, on the other hand, are not equipped or authorized to adjudicate on these matters, as they fall outside the realm of customary or native law.vThe growing trend of litigating banking-related issues in customary courts, particularly those concerning erroneous bank transfers, represents a jurisdictional overreach that risks undermining the integrity of the judicial system. It is critical to note that customary courts do not have the statutory or legal framework to address matters such as breaches of banking contracts or negligence claims, which are inherently tied to modern commercial law. Garnishee Proceedings and Enforcement of Judgments The problem is further compounded by the practice of enforcing judgments issued by customary courts through garnishee proceedings. Garnishee proceedings, governed by the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (SCPA), are meant to be used by specific courts—namely, the High Courts and Magistrate Courts. The SCPA’s interpretation section explicitly states that only these two types of courts have the jurisdiction to issue Garnishee Orders to show cause, a process that allows creditors to collect debt directly from a third party holding the debtor’s funds, such as a bank. Yet, we are witnessing situations where customary courts, in the course of enforcing judgments, are invoking garnishee proceedings. This raises serious concerns, as these courts do not have the authority to do so under the SCPA, and such actions risk violating the clear division of responsibilities between different levels of the Nigerian court system. Further complicating matters, the Customary Court Rules, including those under the Customary Courts Law of Lagos State, specifically vest the enforcement of money judgments with Magistrate Courts. For instance, Order 9 Rule 1 of the Lagos State Customary Court Rules clearly states that only Magistrates’ Courts have the power to enforce monetary judgments. This misalignment between the customary courts and the relevant enforcement mechanisms suggests a serious legal inconsistency that undermines the integrity of the enforcement process. The Need for Judicial Reassessment The judicial system in Nigeria, as in any country, thrives on clarity, consistency, and adherence to established legal principles. The increasing trend of bringing banking and financial disputes, such as erroneous bank transfers, before customary courts represents a disturbing erosion of this principle. Customary courts were not designed to adjudicate on issues pertaining to modern financial transactions, and their involvement in such matters only risks clouding their true purpose: to preserve and enforce native law and customs. It is, therefore, crucial for the Chief Judges of respective states to address this jurisdictional issue. The involvement of customary courts in matters beyond their statutory remit not only jeopardizes the integrity of the judicial system but also creates confusion among litigants about the proper forum for their disputes. The judiciary must take steps to reaffirm the limited scope of customary courts and ensure that matters involving banking errors, breaches of contract, and negligence are directed to the appropriate courts with the necessary jurisdiction and expertise. Our Colleagues at the Bar need to do better In 2025, it is unimaginable that we would be arguing and filing objections on whether or not Customary courts have jurisdiction to entertain banker/customer disputes. The civil jurisdiction of these courts is identical nationwide. For context, section 22 and the first schedule of the Customary Courts Law, Chapter C19, Laws of Lagos State, 2015 prescribes the court’s jurisdiction thus: “(1) Unlimited jurisdiction in matrimonial causes and other matters between persons married under Customary Law or arising from or connected with...

Cryptocurrency is still not illegal in Nigeria: A Digital Rights Lawyer’s Perspective.

I chose this caption advisedly, in spite of my understanding of the Central Bank of Nigeria’s letter dated February 5, 2021 prohibiting “dealing in cryptocurrencies or facilitation of payment for cryptocurrency exchanges.” Nevertheless, I will attempt to justify the caption of my intervention by briefly answering the following questions: Are cryptocurrencies legal tenders within the regulatory purview of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)? The CBN would seem to have answered this question in their letter dated January 12, 2017 that: “The CBN reiterates that VC such as Bitcoin, Ripples, Monero, Litecoin, Dogecoin, Onecoin, etc and similar products are not legal tenders in Nigeria….” Since cryptocurrencies are not legal tenders, one wonders where the CBN derives its arrogated powers to regulate cryptocurrency exchanges especially since the provision of section 2 of the CBN Act and section 1 of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act clearly define the perimeters of CBN’s powers and functions, yet none contemplates regulation of “exchanges” in the mould of virtual currencies. I stand to be corrected on this interpretation though. Apparently, since the CBN was in doubt as to the nature of and appropriate regulatory agency for cryptocurrencies, on the 14th day of September, 2020, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) waded in and cleared CBN’s doubts by issuing a statement to the effect that: “The position of the Commission is that virtual crypto assets are securities, unless proven otherwise” https://sec.gov.ng/statement-on-digital-assets-and-their-classification-and-treatment/Accessed on February 8, 2021 On regulating cryptocurrencies, SEC went ahead to state in their circular that: “Similarly, all Digital Assets Token Offering (DATOs), Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), Security Token ICOs and other Blockchain-based offers of digital assets within Nigeria or by Nigerian issuers or sponsors or foreign issuers targeting Nigerian investors, shall be subject to the regulation of the Commission.” From SEC’s intervention as seen in their circular, it is indubitable that CBN, with respect, jumped the gun by prohibiting “dealing” in an asset over which they do not have regulatory control and such a knee-jerk approach gives an impression of an ill-timed and “unthought out” entry into an unfamiliar terrain since they admitted in their letter of January 12, 2017 that the area is “unregulated.” Thankfully, SEC’s position that cryptocurrencies are securities finds support in a US decision in United States of America v Maskim Zaslavskiy (17 CR 647) where District Judge Raymond Dearie ruled that cryptocurrency is a security and that it would fall under the United State’s Security Exchange Commission’s purview. Enough said on this! Should CBN’s Letter supersede SEC’s statement on cryptocurrencies? Section 13 of the Investments and Securities Tribunal, 2007 (ISA) establishes SEC as the apex regulator of securities. Chambers Dictionary defines the word ‘apex’ as “the highest point.” Hence, it is our modest view that CBN should ordinarily steer clear of virtual currencies since it is outside their areas of competence which ought to be in the exclusive preserve of the SEC. The CBN’s letter was neither referred to as a circular nor a regulation, hence the legal weight to be attached comes into question. Even if it bears such nomenclature, since SEC is designated the apex regulator of securities by the ISA, then their position should always override that of CBN on issues bordering on cryptocurrencies. Does the CBN’s letter criminalise dealing in cryptocurrencies or facilitation of payment for cryptocurrency exchanges? Although CBN’s letter expressly prohibits dealing in cryptocurrency, the source (if any) of such powers is suspect. Assuming they even have such imaginary powers, the courts have ruled that, an offence cannot be created by an administrative circular or letter. For proper context, in Omatseye v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2017) LPELR-42719 (CA), the Court of Appeal held that: “Administrative circulars or notices have its place in government but cannot create an offence. The apex Court in the case of Maideribe v. FRN (2013) LPELR-21861(SC) on circulars held thus: ‘Such circulars are a common form of administrative document by which instructions are disseminated; many such circulars are identified by serial numbers and published and many of them contain general statements of policy… they are therefore of great importance to the public giving much guidance about Governmental organization and the exercise of discretionary powers. In themselves they have no legal effect whatsoever, having no statutory authority. Exhibit “PD16z” is not known to law and therefore cannot create an offence because it was not shown to have been issued under an order, Act, Law or statute. In the absence of statutory authority in the said Exhibit “PD16z” or legal notice it cannot be said to have any legal effect.’” Until the contrary is established, it is our humble position that, the CBN’s letter dated February 5, 2020 remains in the realm of a mere (administrative) letter as admitted by its last paragraph that: “This Letter is with immediate effect”(Emphasis mine) Hence, it cannot create an offence upon which the Nigerian Police can arrest or harass any dealer in cryptocurrency, as one can already imagine. Can the Police arrest dealers in cryptocurrencies? As at press time, there is no law that criminalizes dealing in cryptocurrencies in Nigeria to my knowledge as the provisions of section 36(8) and (12) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As amended) prohibit prosecution for an act which does not constitute an offence at the time of such act. In interpreting section 36(12) of the Nigerian Constitution, the Court of Appeal held in Ibrahim v Nigerian Army (2015) LPELR-24596(CA) that: “The ingredients of section 36(12) of the 1999 Federal Constitution as amended (supra) are as follows: ‘The offence has to be defined in a written law which term refers to:(i) An Act of the National Assembly;(ii) A Law of a State House of Assembly;(iii) Any subsidiary legislation; or(iv) Instrument under the provisions of a law. The penalty shall also be prescribed in a written law which term refers to:(i) An Act of the National Assembly;(ii) A Law of a State;(iii) Any subsidiary legislation; or(iv) Any instrument under the provisions of...

Client/Counsel Relationship: Agency or Independent Contractor?

I have procrastinated on this article for so long but it keeps staring me in the face at different fora and intervals, hence this hurriedly-strung piece on the issue. Superficially, the relationship between a lawyer and his client ordinarily looks simple, since it is contractual in nature, however, in certain circumstances, there may be far-reaching consequences where the lawyer’s authority is put to test. Perhaps, this explains to the divergent positions of our apex court, as would be considered below. Early Judicial Position: Counsel as Independent Contractor In the late eighties, on the nature of Client/Counsel relationship, the court held in Adewunmi v Plastex (Nig.) Ltd. (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 32) 767; (LPELR) 164 (SC) that: “Hence the actual legal relationship between counsel and his client is akin to that of an employer and an independent contractor. It is not between one of principal and agent. It is conceded that where the client gives specific instruction to counsel, such specific instructions must be adhered to. Where there is conflict with the manner of discharging his duties the client or counsel may decide to terminate the relationship. Where counsel is in control of the conduct of a case, his authority extends, when not expressly limited, to the action and all matters incidental to it and to the conduct of the trial to its finality, in what in his opinion is in the best interests of his client.”(Emphasis mine) Reinforcement of the Same Position Later in 1993, following the same path, the court again held in Edozien v Edozien (1993) LPELR – 1020 (SC) that: “There is the usual dominant and general instruction to Counsel to conduct the litigation in court to finality. In carrying out this instruction, counsel functions as an independent contractor who exercises his skill and judgment and is free to act as he considers fit within the instruction in the interest of his client, -See Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Mitchell & Booker Palais de danse Ltd. (1924) 1 KB.762 Counsel acting within the scope of his authority express or implied can bind the client . This was the position in Mathews v. Munster (1888) 20 QB.D.141.”(Emphasis mine) Affirmation in Afegbai’s Case While maintaining same stance in the year 2001, the court held in Afegbai v AG Edo State (2001) LPELR – 193(SC) that: “The nature of the legal relationship between counsel and his client, which exists in this case between plaintiff and PW1, his counsel, is one of an Independent Contractor and not one of principal and agent – See Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Mitchell & Booker Palais de Danse Ltd. (1924) 1KB 762 at p. 765 per Mc Cardie J. It is not that of Master and Servant. Counsel is clearly not a servant of his client.” A Sharp Judicial Turn: Counsel as Agent Against the run of its earlier decisions, especially in Afegbai’s case above where it was expressly held that the relationship is not that of principal and agent, the court took a sharp turn in the more recent case of Ogboru v Uduaghan (2013) LPELR -20805(SC) where Chukwumah-Eneh, JSC (as he then was) did not mince words when his lordship, while ruling on how a counsel binds his client, held that: “It is settled that the relationship that arises from a litigant instructing a solicitor to act on his behalf in a Court proceeding (as the instant one) gives rise to a solicitor and client relationship otherwise founded on agency and in strict confidence… … It cannot be otherwise as counsel is supposed to operate within his instructions and thus stave off the unnecessary embarrassment in Court of counsel constantly having to be seeking further instructions as issues keep cropping up in Court in the course of the proceedings.” “It is settled that the relationship that arises from a litigant instructing a solicitor to act on his behalf in a Court proceeding (as the instant one) gives rise to a solicitor and client relationship otherwise founded on agency and in strict confidence. By this relationship, counsel rightly takes over completely the control and conduct of his client’s case in Court and this situation underscores the proposition of the presumption though rebuttal that once counsel has announced his appearance in Court as counsel representing acting on behalf of a litigant in any proceedings before the Court, counsel is presumed not only to be legally qualified qua counsel to act in that capacity but also in doing so he is taken as having been fully instructed to act in the matter in the proceedings.” …. I must observe that based on decided authorities, it is settled that counsel as the ostensible agent of his client binds his client where he makes a compromise or settlement during the course of a trial; in that case the client is bound even though he has given his counsel no authority to do so. This view is solidly founded on the case of Strauss v. Frances (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 379.”(Emphasis mine) Conclusion Conclusively, as the writer could not lay his hands on a more recent decision that Ogboru’s case on this issue, it is safe to assume that same represents the current position of our laws until the contrary is established. See Kanu v Asuzu (2015) LPELR – 24376 (CA). Although, as tricky as it may appear, if the Supreme Court’s decision in Ogboru’s case remains the most recent on the issue, then a Counsel is an agent of his Client and of course, with far-flung consequences for both parties in terms of their actions and inactions.

Celebrating the Recent Judicial Recognition of Access to Internet as a Fundamental Right in Nigeria

When the tides of banditry hit a crescendo in 2021, the Kaduna State Government instructed the major telecommunication companies to disconnect citizens’ access to the Internet in that State. However, when such measures did not necessarily stem the tides of insecurity in the State, in 2022, our Law Firm approached the Federal High Court sitting in Kaduna in Suit No. FHC/KD/CS/80/2022 between Inc. Trustees of Laws and Rights Awareness Initiative and Attorney General, Kaduna, strategically seeking a couple of reliefs, one of which was:   “A DECLARATION that access to the Internet is a digital right i.e fundamental right guaranteed under chapter 4 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) but exercised and enjoyed online and on digital platforms.” While preparing the court processes, our research did not reveal the existence of any Nigerian court decision declaring Access to the Internet as a fundamental right, hence we made it our first prayer – providing a foundation for the other consequential reliefs sought.   The case suffered many adjournments but on the 24th day of January 2024, R.M. Aikawa, J. interestingly declared that:   “While expounding these provisions, the Court of Appeal had this to say: “My Lords, the right to freedom of expression and the press as recognized and guaranteed by law, is geared towards the safeguarding of the right of the citizen to impart and information as permitted by law. It therefore, exists to protect the right to seek and receive information for the purpose of disseminating such ideas and purpose and ideas as well as the right to freely express for the information opinions orally or through publications. The real essence of this right, therefore, is to guarantee to each citizen the right within the purview of the law to express himself freely without unjustifiable interference” see the case of Shuaibu & Ors. v Utomwen & Ors” …These provisions upon which these decisions are anchored should answer the Applicant’s questions in the affirmative that access to the Internet is a fundamental right as it is a medium to right of freedom of expression as constitutionally guaranteed under section 39 of the 1999 Constitution as amended….Thus… right of access to internet is generally guaranteed by our constitution as a medium of free expression.” In conclusion, although the court did not grant the consequential reliefs, the decision still constitutes a win and another reference point for digital rights litigation in Nigeria.

“Criminalising bigamy does not violate the right to privacy” the Federal High Court sides with the Attorney General of the Federation

In research conducted in 2024, I discovered that there is no reported (appellate court) decision where a Nigerian has been jailed for bigamy, but we still retain such provisions in our statute books. Even the Supreme Court referred to such provision as a “dead letter” in Simeon Kuforiji v V.Y.B. Nigeria Limited (1981) LPELR-1716(SC). I also discovered there is no existing decision where the bigamy provisions have been tested against the demands of constitutional right to privacy, so I approached the court to test our laws in Suit No. FHC/LF/FHR/48/2025 against the Attorney General of the Federation. Locus standi was not an issue since I am a married Nigerian.  Via originating summons filed on 23rd July 2024, I posed the following questions: Whether or not the provisions of section 370 of the Criminal Code; section 387 of the Penal Code (Northern States) and section 384 of the Penal Code Act criminalizing bigamy interfere with the right to privacy of Nigerian citizens contrary to section 37 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999?   Whether or not the provisions of section 370 of the Criminal Code; section 387 of the Penal Code (Northern States) and section 384 of the Penal Code Act criminalizing bigamy are justifiable in a democratic setting like Nigeria’s under section 45 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999?   The AGF’s office filed a robust answer to my questions and in resolving the dispute, Hon. Justice M.O. Olajuwon interestingly held as follows:   On interpretation of provisions criminalising bigamy “This section also only applies to a man who is subject to a customary law in which extra-marital sexual intercourse is recognised as a crime and not evert married man. It follows that, if the custom of such a man does not criminalise extra-marital intercourse, he will not be guilty of committing a crime, except it amounts to rape”   On whether the provision interferes with privacy within a cultural context   “Based on the above interpretations, the key focus is understanding privacy within the constitutional context, comparing individual rights with societal standards and legal frameworks. I am of the considered view that the laws (The Codes) honour various cultural and religious beliefs without violating privacy. The Codes balance individual rights and communal values, safeguarding the privacy of individuals while respecting the cultural and religious tenets of communities. The Criminal Code and Penal Codes in question in this suit do not violate citizens’ privacy but correspond with the constitutional rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion found in section 38 of the Constitution and when applied in context, they protect privacy and constitutionally while recognising the societal needs to uphold public morality…. I hold therefore that the Criminal and Penal Codes in issue have not in any way interfered with the right to privacy.” The considered decision of My Lord, Olagunju, J. represents a few things: First, it recognises that there are Nigerian communities where bigamy as defined, does not constitute an offence. Secondly, it interestingly identifies the theoretical issue around individualism and collectivism within the context of privacy – this underscore a major difference between the Western approach to privacy (individualism) and the African/Asian approach to privacy (collectivism). However, even though I may(will) not appeal the decision, the court conflated or equated the consequences of voidness of a second marriage under the Marriage Act with criminality under the Codes when the learned judge made an analogy with volenti-non-fit injuria regarding anyone who chooses to marry under the Act.

Between FRA Williams and Justice Karibi-Whyte, the constitutional origins of right to privacy in Nigeria must be ascertained.

In my PhD thesis, a chapter interrogates the origins of the right to privacy in Nigeria. Despite the dearth of academic resources on the historical trajectory of fundamental rights in Nigeria, the few accounts are at variance on how the bills of rights entered into our constitution. This article is my way of crying for help perhaps our learned ancestors who are still alive can offer some guidance on the first Nigerian Constitution that introduced fundamental rights either in the schedule or as a full chapter.   The inconsistent academic accounts  In an article published in 1960, Prof Alan Gledhill (Professor Emeritus of Oriental Laws at the University of London) traces the history of fundamental rights in the Nigerian Constitution to 1954 when he notes that: “Fundamental human rights have now been written into the Nigerian constitution, and the first two decisions involving fundamental rights in Nigeria, both from the Northern Court, have recently come to hand.” In the article, the learned professor references two cases filed in 1959 invoking the right to freedom of assembly, conscience and privacy guaranteed in the 6th schedule to Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954. (see Alan Gledhill, ‘Fundamental Rights in Northern Nigeria’ (1960) 4(2) Journal of African Law, 115- 117).   Conversely, in another article published five years later, a former Solicitor General of the Federation, Godfrey Amachree writes that not until the 1957 Constitutional conference in London, fundamental rights weren’t known to the Nigerian constitution. He notes that: “At the Constitutional Conference held in London in May and June 1957, it was agreed that provisions should be made in the Independence Constitution for fundamental rights…The Commission divided the fundamental rights into five groups which they recommended should be included in the Constitution… The recommendations were adopted and incorporated in the Constitution as Chapter 3” (see Godfrey K. J. Amachree, “Fundamental Rights in Nigeria” (1965) 11(2) Howard LJ 463).   As far as my research has led me, I am yet to find any other published author who has written on the constitutional debut of fundamental rights in Nigeria, hence these contradictory academic accounts remain unresolved.      Unreconciled judicial accounts   In 1959, the late learned sage – FRA Williams, SAN – filed a suit on behalf of J.S. Olawoyin seeking the following relief: “A declaration that Part VIII of the Children and Young Persons Law 1958 has been rendered void and unenforceable by the provisions of sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Sixth Schedule to Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council 1954”   While delivering the judgment on appeal, Unsworth FJ acknowledged the inclusion of fundamental rights in the 1954 Constitution thus:  “The Constitution in force at the time of the hearing in the lower Court was the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the 1954 Constitution) and the sections of the Sixth Schedule to that Constitution referred to in the claim contained provisions protecting fundamental rights relating to private and family life …” (See J.S. Olawoyin v. Attorney General of Northern Nigeria (1962) 1 ANLR 324).   In 1982, the Court of Appeal was invited to rule on whether Shugaba Darman’s deportation violated his fundamental rights where Karibi-Whyte, JCA (as he then was) recounted this historical trajectory of fundamental rights in Nigeria thus: “The earliest attempt to incorporate fundamental rights in the Constitution was at the 1957 Constitutional Conference… It however went on to recommend the entrenchment in the Constitution of fundamental rights as a safeguard for minorities, as a check against the abuse of majority power…Relying on the nature and the confidence reposed on the efficacy of these provisions as a guarantee of the rights and liberties of the individual, they were introduced in time before the elections campaign at the end of 1959.” (see Federal Minister of Internal Affairs v. Shugaba Abdulrahman Darman (1982) 2 NCLR 915)   Conclusion The documented accounts point to two different dates and incidents as the origin of fundamental rights in the Nigerian Constitution. Perhaps, this confusion would have been resolved if the publicly accessible 1954 Constitution had a sixth schedule at all. So much has been written about constitutional development in Nigeria but this historical vagueness remains unclarified.

The avoidable privacy breach in Dr Abalaka’s defamation judgment and the urgent need to regulate law reporting in Nigeria

My research on the overlap between privacy and defamation led me to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Dr Jeremiah Abalaka v Prof. Ibironke Akinsete (2023) LPELR-60349(SC) where the following statement is published in the law report: “The Appellant claimed that he has found a vaccine to cure HIV/AIDS. The 3rd Respondent, a retired soldier living with HIV used the said vaccine and according to him, he is still HIV positive. The 3rd Respondent also gave the statistics of 30 soldiers who have used the vaccine and some according to him, are dead while others are still living with HIV.” As it is the unchallenged practice of law reporters in Nigeria to publish verbatim judgments, reading through the judgment, the unmasked identity of the party living with HIV is revealed in the judgment reported by law reports. As a privacy professional, this got me thinking and I share my thoughts in the following brief paragraphs: There are no visible regulators or regulations on law reporting in Nigeria In her article published in 1972 by the Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, Jill Cottrell Ghai– a former law lecturer at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria – traces the history of law reporting in Nigeria to 1915 when the Government Printer in Lagos published the first edition of the (now abandoned or relegated) Nigeria Law Reports. Over 109 years after the debut, my research has been unable to lead me to any regulation, policy, guideline or other legislation of law reporting in Nigeria. While it is “known” that the Supreme Court issues licences or permits for law reporting, I could not find the legislation upon which these authorizations are issued vis a vis the rules of engagement. If this piece of legislation exists, then it is not publicly accessible, making it impossible for the public to hold law reports to any standards. Court judgments and privacy Yes, court judgments are public documents, but they are not inimical to the notion of privacy. Otherwise, there would not be statutory and procedural provisions excluding the public from some court proceedings – the definition of which includes court processes and judgments. (see Ezeudu v Adeka (2016) LPELR-40807(CA). For context, while section 36(4)(a) of the 1999 Constitution empowers the court to exclude the public from certain proceedings where the private lives of parties will be prejudiced, section 12 of the Freedom of Information Act allows non-disclosure of information in a public record where disclosure will infringe on the data subject’s privacy. Interestingly, the Matrimonial Causes Act empowers the courts to restrict the publication of parties’ personal information in deserving cases. Neither our courts nor the law reports have taken full advantage of these provisions. Unfair reporting and data minimization Law reporters are largely unregulated in Nigeria but as data controllers who particularly process sensitive personal data, they are subject to the provisions of the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (NDPA). By section 24(1)(a), law reporting companies are meant to be fair in their handling of personal data especially as reflected in the judgments they publish. Fairness, in data protection parlance, contemplates respecting the (privacy) rights of the data subject. By this principle, data processing must be carried out in a way that does not harm or disadvantage the data subject. This includes ensuring that the data subject’s dignity, privacy, and reputation are protected during and after the data processing. The question is – does publishing a party’s identity or HIV status, as done in Abalaka’s case preserve the dignity of such party? Additionally, section 24(1)(c) NDPA mandates controllers to process only the minimum personal data necessary for the purpose of collection. This principle is know as ‘data minimization’ designed to protect individuals’ privacy by ensuring that only the minimum amount of personal data necessary for a specific purpose is collected, processed, and retained.  Data minimization requires that only the personal data that is absolutely necessary to achieve a specific purpose should be collected. Any data that is not needed for the defined purpose should not be collected or stored. In reporting judgments, some highly sensitive personal data ought not be published in the report. In Abalaka’s case, the 3rd Respondent’s identity need not be revealed in the law report, this is not necessary for the purpose of reporting a case on defamation. Non-disclosure of his identity will not diminish the report especially since other parties are identified. International best practices Keeping up with their aspirations to deliver world-class law reporting services, then Nigerian law reports must regulated to maintain such standards. Currently, there is no official regulator/regulation for law reporting in Nigeria. In the UK, they have Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1926; the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales (ICLR) regulates law reporting together with the courts which issue practice direction for the publication of judgments e.g Practice Guidance: Anonymisation And Avoidance Of The Identification Of Children; Reporting Restrictions in the Criminal Courts; Transparency In The Family Courts. Publication Of Judgments Practice Guidance etc. In South Africa, while some cases are filed with anonymised names, some judgments are published with anonymized names for privacy reasons. Cases bordering ion divorce, sexual violence, custody and maintenance of children are routinely filed by masking the parties’ identities and such identities are also concealed in the law reports. In Kenya, the National Council for Law Reporting anonymization guidelines for judgment publications. See Tumaz and Tumaz Enterprises Limited v National Council for Law Reporting [2022] KEHC 14747 (KLR). Nigeria, is long over due for a regulator and regulations in this regard. Recommendations The publication of court judgments, often referred to as law reporting, is a critical aspect of legal transparency and the development of jurisprudence. However, in Nigeria, the current approach to law reporting lacks a regulatory framework that ensures the protection of personal data, privacy, and the ethical publication of sensitive information. Given the increasing importance of data protection globally, as well as the growing focus on privacy and fairness, it is essential to align Nigeria’s law reporting practices with international best...

ASAKE’S PBUY AND THE POLICEWOMAN’S CRY FOR “EPP”: WHERE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FAILS, PRIVACY SAILS

Lawyers and researchers continue to decry the disruption of traditionally settled intellectual property (IP) principles by the characteristically unpredictable growth of AI and technology. Since time of yore, copyright in literary, artistic works or sound recordings had been attributable to the author – a term with clear definition generally recognising the ‘creator’ of work – but AI has come to blur such lines. While stakeholders are still struggling with the uncertainty of IP claims on AI-generated content, social media introduced another twist where sound recordings are randomly or deliberately picked by musical artistes who casually add such clips to their songs without recourse to the characters involved in the clips. Here, Asake’s song ‘Peace be unto you’ comes to mind. In the song, Asake sampled the voice of a distraught policewoman (Helen Utabo) who cried for help in a video when a motorist attempted ferrying her away. From an IP perspective, Raphael Irenen argues that Utabo is not entitled to royalties since she does not qualify as an ‘author’ under section 28 of the Nigeria Copyright Act but without referencing any provision of law, Stanley Alieke conversely argues that the woman is entitled royalties on the ground that she is a ‘co-owner’ whose consent was not sought. (see The Woman In The Help Me, Help Me Vocals Is Entitled To Royalties From Asake < https://www.tekedia.com/the-woman-in-the-help-me-help-me-vocals-is-entitled-to-royalties-from-asake/>) However, that is not why I am here!. Without agreeing or joining issues with the commentators on the IP claims, I choose to identify privacy or data protection as a ‘less’ argumentative claim Utabo can make to her distinct voice in the sound recording. “Epp me Epp me” – a personal data? I approach this with caution bearing in mind, first, the controversial elasticity that has been ascribed to the term ‘personal data’ in the respective data protection legislation and the often-unobserved qualifying adverbs in such definitions. The stretchy scope of personal data is further made worse by the unpredictability of technology as observed by some researchers thus:  “Even though the definition of personal information might seem straightforward, recent rapid advancements in technology have made it surprisingly difficult to characterise its scope.” (See Rahime Saglam et al, ‘Personal information: Perceptions, types and evolution’ (2020) 66 Journal of Information Security and Applications). Decrying the universally unclosed categories of information that could constitute personal data, Raphaël Gellert – an assistant professor of ICT at the Radboud University, Netherlands notes that “The EU debate—both at policy and academic level—around the notion of personal data has been a steadily ongoing one” (see Raphaël Gellert, ‘Personal data’s ever-expanding scope in smart environments and possible path(s) for regulating emerging digital technologies’ (2021) 11(2) International Data Privacy Law, 196–208). From a Nigerian’s perspective, Omotubora (alongside Bashu) expresses her concerns on the expansive outlook of personal data thus: “This interpretation of personal data is inherently “expansionist” and regarded as fundamental to the protection of individuals” (see Omotubora, A and Basu, S orcid.org/0000-0001-5863-854X (2020) Next Generation Privacy. Information & Communications Technology Law. ISSN 1360-0834). Regardless of the existing academic paroxysms against the amoebous definition legislatively given to personal data, its extant statutory idea protects any information that indirectly identifies a person including distorted information. From this potentially problematic definition, once a piece of information can be remotely or closely linked to a person, then such is his/her personal data.  Notwithstanding autotune or any other AI-enabled voice-tweaking device, the policewoman’s now famous “Epp me,  epp me, he dey carry me go where I no know” identifies her or is somewhat linked to her, hence such constitutes her personal data under the Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023 (NDPA). Elsewhere, some German researchers argue that: “In addition to the linguistic content of speech, a speaker’s voice characteristics and manner of expression may implicitly contain a rich array of personal information, including cues to a speaker’s biometric identity, personality, physical traits, geographical origin, emotions, level of intoxication and sleepiness, age, gender, and health condition. Even a person’s socioeconomic status can be reflected in certain speech patterns.” (See Jacob Leon Kröger et al, ‘Privacy Implications of Voice and Speech Analysis – Information Disclosure by Inference’ Privacy and Identity 2019: Privacy and Identity Management. Data for Better Living: AI and Privacy pp 242–258). Her cry is on social media – still protected? A ready-made moral defence instantly wielded by privacy-violators is the publicly accessible nature of personal data as if social media or the public completely erases reasonable expectation of privacy. This should be approached from both privacy and data protection perspectives – a necessity that amplifies the distinction between the closely related concepts. While some information proactively displayed on social media by data subjects may not enjoy reasonable expectations of privacy, they are nevertheless provided by relevant data protection legislation.  As far as privacy is concerned, the Nigerian Court of Appeal confirms Nigerians’ entitlement to a reasonable expectation of privacy in public via the decision in Nwali v EBSIEC (2014) LPELR–23682(CA) thus: “The correct approach to the determination of the scope of the right of privacy vested by S. 37 of the 1999 Constitution is to first state the right as prescribed by the express provisions of the section without omitting any aspect of the right…Therefore, the privacy of his choice of that candidate and the privacy of his voting for that candidate constitute part of his “privacy” as a citizen… Therefore requiring or compelling him to vote openly in the public watch and knowledge by queuing in front of the poster carrying the portrait of the candidate he has decided to vote for intrudes into, interferes with, and invades the privacy of his said decision, choice and voting, completely removing that privacy, therefore amounting to a clear violation of his fundamental right to the privacy of a citizen guaranteed him and protected by S.37 of the 1999 Constitution.” (Emphasis mine) The decision above speaks to the protection of privacy even when someone or his personal data is in the public and for fuller measure. In the policewoman’s...

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