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Amendment of Section 24 of the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention etc) Act 2015: A Fruit of Strategic Litigation

Strategic litigation has been defined as “using legal means aiming to ‘bring about broad societal changes beyond the scope of the individual case at hand” (ECCHR) – this simple definition clearly resonates with the subject of this article. When in 2015, the Federal Government enacted the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention etc) Act (the Act), the legislation immediately became a ready-made tool of oppression used by politicians against investigative journalists and other voices of dissent. Consequently, in 2016, three civil societies approached me to challenge its constitutionality in court and that marked the beginning of the long-drawn legal battle spanning eight years across national and regional courts. The offensive provision Section 24 of the Act provide(d) that: “Any person who knowingly or intentionally sends a message or other matter by means of computer systems or network that – (a) is grossly offensive, …or causes any such message or matter to be so sent …commits an offence under this Act and shall be liable on conviction to a fine of not more than N7,000,000.00 or imprisonment for a term of not more than 3 years or to both such fine and imprisonment.” Our umbrage was against the use of the word “offensive” since it was neither defined nor described under the Act, hence subject to self-centred and inconsistent interpretation by whoever sought to use them. The Legal battles On the 23rd day of May 2016, we filed an originating summons at the Federal High Court sitting in Lagos predominantly seeking a declaration that section 24 of the Act violates freedom of speech. The suit was heard by Hon. Justice M.B Idris (now JSC) who struck it out on the 20th day of January 2017. Undeterred in our quest to rid our laws of such an archaic provision, we approached the Court of Appeal but before the appeal was struck out on the 1st day of June 2018, the court perhaps, appreciated our strategic litigation drive when the presiding justice, Justice J.S. Ikyegh (of blessed memory) held that: “I commend Mr. Babalola, of learned counsel for the appellants, for the industry and research put in the brief for the appeal and, also, for the secondary copies of the foreign decisions and materials learned counsel graciously made available to the Court for the appeal.” (Reported as Inc. Trustees of Paradigm Initiative and Attorney General of the Federation (2018) LPELR – 46655(CA) Even though at that time, it seemed we lost the appeal but now it is clear we actually won! I will explain this later. Again, we proceeded to the Supreme Court where we lodged another appeal and filed our brief since 2019 but up till this moment, no date has been fixed for the appeal due to the unimaginable workload of the apex court – I hope the judiciary finds a way out of this unpleasant reality soon!. Our strategic (litigation) move The Community Court of Justice (ECOWAS) court presents another avenue for litigants to ventilate their issues where they cannot get justice before the national courts. Unlike the African Commission, the ECOWAS court does not have a procedural rule that requires the exhaustion of local remedies before approaching the court. So, in 2018, we represented another civil society before the ECOWAS court where the same provisions were challenged and thankfully on the 10th day of July 2020, the court delivered judgment in our favour thus: “The Defendant State (Nigeria), by adopting the provisions of section 24 of the Cybercrime (Prohibition, Prevention etc) Act 2015 violated Articles 9(2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” The court then consequently ordered Nigeria to repeal or amend Section 24 of the Cybercrime Act 2015 in accordance with her obligations under the African Charter and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). (See Inc. Trustees of Laws and Rights Awareness Initiative v Federal Republic of Nigeria (ECW/CCJ/JUD/16/20). Like many other ECOWAS court decisions, the judgment was not obeyed by the Nigerian government, hence we wrote letters to the Attorney General of the Federation and we even filed other strategic suits for the interpretation of relevant sections of the Constitution including questions on whether or not the Attorney General is duty-bound to advise the government to comply with judgments of the ECOWAS court – the appeal is still pending. The Results after eight years of litigation Finally, on the 28th day of February 2024, the Federal Government signed into law the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention etc) (Amendment Act) giving effect the judgment of the ECOWAS Court. The nebulous and problematic part of Section 24 (reproduced above) has now been repealed and replaced to read: “Any person who knowingly or intentionally sends a message or other matter by means of computer systems or network that – Pornographic: or He knows to be false, for the purpose of causing a breakdown of law and order, posting a threat to life or causing such message to be sent… commits an offence under this Act and shall be liable on conviction to a fine of not more than N7,000,000.00 or imprisonment for a term of not more than 3 years or to both such fine and imprisonment.” (Emphasis mine) This new-look section 24 even though not Eldorado, is a better version which aligns more with democratic dictates and expectations.  Other low-hanging fruits for privacy and data protection At the Court of Appeal, before striking out the appeal, Hon. Justice B.A. Georgewill, JCA significantly held that: “I only wish to state that the provision of Section 38 of the Cybercrime (Prohibition, Prevention etc) Act 2015, though neither unconstitutional: nor null and void, needs a further look at by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with a view to, in my respectful opinion, amending it to subject the exercise of powers or right to request for the release of any information required to be kept by service providers to the order of a Court of competent jurisdiction...

Courts can now call oral evidence in fundamental rights’ cases: the bitter-sweet Court of Appeal decision in Olumide Babalola and Emerging Market & Others (2021) LPELR – 55974(CA)

In 2016, I filed a privacy class action against the four telecommunications giants (MTN, Etisalat, Airtel and Glo) for unsolicited telephone calls and telemarketing at the High Court of Lagos State. The certification order was granted by My Lord, S.A. Onigbanjo (Rtd) and we same was publicised in print and electronic media. Upon service of the originating processes on the Respondents, they expectedly briefed eminent legal practitioners (including two senior advocates) to defend the class action.  After hearing the parties, the High Court delivered its judgment on the 17th day of January 2018 when the court held that our suit was not properly suited for fundamental rights and that our case could not be determined without calling oral testimonies. We immediately appealed the decision on two grounds and our appeal was allowed on the 29th day of September 2021but the decision raises some interesting issues worthy of emphasis. Our suit before the High Court was a fundamental rights action  As of 2016 when we filed the suit, there was no record of any decision of the Court of Appeal where an umbrage at unsolicited telephone calls was litigated under the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules 2009 (Eneye’s case was decided much later in May 2018). At the High Court, the learned Judge was of the opinion that our suit was inappropriate as a fundamental rights action but the Court of Appeal per M.I. Sirajo, JCA held otherwise that: “The appellants action before the trial court was for enforcement of fundamental rights. It was filed pursuant to … section 37 of the Constitution…. Before the trial court, the Appellants sought two declarations with respect to the infringement of their right to privacy by the Respondents’ unsolicited telephone calls and sms messages to their telephone lines…The jurisdiction of the Federal, State and FCT High Courts to entertain cases of breach of fundamental rights is not in dispute. It is not also in dispute that the two principal reliefs sought by the Appellants before the lower court are for enforcement of fundamental right to private and family life. (see page 16 of the judgment) Oral evidence can be called in fundamental rights cases At the appeal, we argued strenuously that oral evidence cannot be called in fundamental rights enforcement cases and relied on Ogunwunmiju, JCA’s (now JSC) statement in Afribank v Adigun’s case that the law does not contemplate calling of oral evidence in fundamental rights cases.  Surprisingly, My Lord Sirajo, JCA quoted extensively and relied on same decision to rule that: “From the decision quoted above, what the trial court in the instant case ought to have done, having found that there are material conflicts in the opposing affidavits of the parties, was to consider the documentary exhibits annexed to the affidavit and try to resolve the conflicts. Where the trial court finds that the documentary exhibits cannot resolve the conflicts in the affidavits then it can call for oral evidence.” (see page 23)  This decision appears a paradigm shift from the popular position that oral evidence cannot be called in fundamental rights cases which ought to be exclusively won or lost on affidavit evidence. Conclusively, the Court of Appeal refused to invoke the provision of section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act due to the inadequacy of the record of appeal, hence the parties were ordered to return to the High Court of Lagos State to start afresh. Notwithstanding the disappointment of starting de novo, the gains of the Court of Appeal’s decision especially on identification of cause of action (privacy) and the proper forum are arguably important for the continued growth of the jurisprudence around right to privacy in Nigeria.

Privacy Versus Data Protection Debate in Nigeria: The Two Schools of Thought.

Privacy and data protection (as a practice area) is relatively nascent and in its developmental stages in Nigeria: the main legislation are inadequate or inelegantly drafted, the regulator is facing legitimacy and capacity challenges, professionals are few and ill-equipped, industry practitioners a little bit laid-back and ultimately, the government is, regrettably, sluggish with its legislative attempts towards birthing a principal legislation for data protection. From my experience as a privacy litigator, the first issue that confronts an Applicant in Nigerian courts is, whether or not data protection is actionable as a fundamental right to privacy, or they are to be approached as one of those statutory rights litigable under the regular civil procedure as opposed to the sui generis approach under the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules 2009. Some notable Nigerian academics and legal practitioners have embraced two schools of thought along the lines of their professional convictions and proclivities, while seemingly situating same on their perceived state of the relevant data protection legislation in Nigeria. Data Protection is not Privacy (First School) Academia From an academic perspective, Dr. Adekemi Omotubora, a senior lecturer at the University of Lagos appears, with respect, the most vociferous and consistent Nigerian proponent of this school of thought, who doesn’t spare blushes when expressing her belief that data protection should be distinguished and severed from right to privacy. In the wake of issuance of Nigeria Data Protection Regulation in 2019, the learned academic penned an instructive article on “The NITDA Regulations on Data Protection: A Peculiarly Nigerian Approach?” wherein she asserted that: “The critical point here is that the assumption underlying an objective to safeguard ‘a right to data privacy’ in the Regulation is misguided if not unconstitutional. It is misguided because it shows lack of understanding of the conceptual differences between privacy and data protection. It is unconstitutional because it aims to safeguard a non-existent right to data privacy. Therefore, unless we can argue, presumably ingeniously, that it is possible for the NITDA Regulation to create a right to data privacy, then the entire Regulation could be challenged for its unconstitutionality.” Again, in March 2020, she co-authored a scholarly paper titled “Next Generation Privacy” published in Routledge Information and Communications Technology Law Journal where she posited that: “Perhaps to further underline the distinction between the two concepts, the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) created a separate right to data protection in article 8 although the authorities had already proclaimed that protection of personal data must be seen as fundamental to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention….While it remains unclear whether and how a new fundamental right to personal data and a change in nomenclature (from privacy to data protection) would herald a new jurisprudence of data protection, it is clear that the EU law now considers the interchangeable use of privacy for data protection an anomaly.” Litigators’ Submission From the practicing lawyers’ perspective, the Law Firm of Templars (one of Nigeria’s largest commercial law firms) recently released a publication titled “Enforcing Data Subject Right Under Nigeria’s Data Protection Regulation: The Wrong Way (And the Right Way)” wherein they pitched their tent with this school of thought as follows: “…we would readily throw our weight behind the FHCN’s decision. The reason is not far-fetched. The FHCN’s reasoning that, a breach of a Data Subject’s rights under the NDPR cannot be remedied by way of an action brought under the FREP Rules aligns with the basis for FREP Rules, as a specialized procedure reserved for enforcement of fundamental rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution or the African Charter… In light of the foregoing backdrop, it may not be out of place to adjust the FREP Rules in a way that would make the Rules readily amenable and flexible to accommodate emerging rights, such as the Data Subject’s rights in the NDPR, that are similar to the rights of citizens specifically provided for in the Constitution. But until such an adjustment, it may be important that originating processes with the reliefs sought in an action brought under the FREP Rules, are carefully couched to avoid being thrown out of court at a preliminary stage of the proceedings. The substantive or principal claim must be in relation to a breach of a fundamental right as contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution or African Charter, while the ancillary claim may be a breach of the provisions of the NDPR. Better still, and perhaps, a better approach, would be to make a claim for breach of the NDPR and NITDA Act a stand-alone proceeding, rather than lumping it together with a fundamental right enforcement action under the FREP Rules. That way, any unnecessary controversy with its attendant risks, can be avoided.” Judicial Decisions In two separate judgments delivered by the Federal High Court in 2020, the very hardworking late Hon. Justice Ibrahim Watila (God rest his soul) did not mince words when his lordship held that data protection has nothing to do with right to privacy under section 37 of the Nigerian Constitution and actions bordering on data breach cannot be validly brought under fundamental rights procedure. (See the unreported decisions in Suit No. FHC/AB/CS/85/2020 between Digital Rights Lawyers Initiative and Unity Bank and Suit No. FHC/AB/CS/79 between Laws and Rights Awareness Initiative and National Identity Management Commission delivered in December 2020.) Data Protection is cognizable under Right to Privacy (Second School) Academia Dr. Lukman Adekunle Abdulrauf, a lecturer at the University of Ilorin, is arguably Nigeria’s most prolific scholarly writer on data protection with several papers published in local and international journals and lends his weight to this school of thought that posits data protection as a human right. In his co-authored work published in Springer’s Liverpool Law Review titled “Personal Data Protection in Nigeria: Reflections on Opportunities, Options and Challenges to Legal Reforms”, he contends that: “Without ignoring the strengths of the arguments in favour of data...

A Rejoinder to Sylvester Udemezue’s ‘Determining Whether WhatsApp is a Public Place: The Legal Perspective’

In the course of data collation for my recent article titled ‘The Nigerian lawyer, his/her emails, WhatsApp groups and unresolved privacy questions’ I found a thought-provoking article written by Mr. Sylvester Udemezue (Udems – as fondly called) since 2019 on the nature of WhatsApp – a cross platform, instant messaging app – as a private space. I found his perspective rather interesting and understandable given he was one of my lecturers at the Nigerian law school. He is a law teacher of note who has commendably written many articles on various areas of the Nigerian law.  I initially wanted to look away from the rather ‘old’ article because I thought Udems’ position might have changed in the light of technological disruptions and improvements that have occurred since 2019, but I gave it a second thought. For whatever this is worth, a rejoinder on the issue will contribute to the growing body of knowledge in the field and bring further perspectives to the emerging area of our law. In the preface to my book titled ‘Privacy and data protection law in Nigeria (Noetico Repertum, Lagos, 2021), I expressed my hope that more Nigerian researchers and academics will write on privacy and grow the field, little did I know that Udems had written such an interesting article since 2019.  Having read the article titled ‘Determining Whether WhatsApp is a Public Place: The Legal Perspective’ the following are my respectful observations and comments: Surprisingly, unlike the vintage Udems who writes with forceful and sometimes highly persuasive conviction, the prolific writer starts this article with “I THINK it is a private place”. That didn’t read like Udems, rather it gave an initial idea of a writer who is also not sure of his position. However, lest this overshadows my intervention, it is inconsequential in the scheme of things. Now to the more serious issues. Learned Udems relies on “Black’s Law Dictionary” for the definition of the word ‘public’ but my learned teacher does not reference the edition. The first edition of that dictionary was published in 1891 way before the invention of the Internet in 1983 or Whatsapp which was founded in 2009. For the sake of argument, let us assume Udems referenced the 11th edition published in 2019 by Bryan A. Garner, the word ‘public’ is defined as: “Of or relating to or relating to or involving an entire community, state or country.” A public place relates to “an entire community” but the learned teacher omits to analyse the import of a community in the definition. For the avoidance of doubt, Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th edition defines community as: ‘a society or group of people with similar rights or interests.’ From that definition, any group of people with a common purpose constitutes a community. So, any WhatsApp group set up for a particular objective (rules) unifying the members constitutes a community, hence covered by the definition of public. Udems surprisingly references ‘the dictionary’ for the definition of public. As of today, there are well over twenty reputable English dictionaries, hence, the readers of his article are at a loss on the particular one referenced therein. Further in defining ‘public place’ Udems relies on the Criminal Code of 1958, a 2007 decision of the Supreme Court and Public Order Act of 1979!!!! This is just like defining email through the lenses of Wireless Telegraphy Act – the World has metamorphosed into a global village and words now have new meanings as contemplated and enabled by technological advancement. With the advent of social media, the meaning of ‘public’ changed. A virtual room with the telephone numbers of over 250 participants scattered all over the globe with or without personal relationships should not by any stretch of imagination be tagged as a private place. The nature of WhatsApp groups should not be analysed in isolation of practical functionality and the objectives of the administrators of each group. Hence, generalisation of Whatsapp groups as private places is not realistic when the objectives and participants of such groups are considered. For example, can one realistically consider a WhatsApp group of lawyers who discuss the affairs of the bar, bench and the society as a private space? While Udems is fixated on the definition of ‘public’ in arguing that a WhatsApp group is a private space his well-written article, for curious reasons, he completely ignores the meaning of the word ‘private’ in his analysis. For the avoidance of doubt, the Black’s Law Dictionary (11th edition) defines ‘private’ as: ‘of relating to or involving an individual or confidential, secret’, Chambers 21st Century Dictionary (8th edition) inter alia defines the word as ‘relating to someone’s personal as distinct from their professional life, kept secret from others, confidential’, and the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English ( defines the word as ‘a private meeting conversation etc involves only two people or a small number of people and is not for others to know or information or opinions not for other people to know’.  With the set up and objectives and discussions in most WhatsApp groups, one wonders if any participant or the administrator can reasonably see those proceedings as private and secret matters that must not be made public except of course, there are clear rules that such discussions must not be divulged to non-members of such virtual communities. WhatsApp groups are mostly online communities of most unrelated participants who co-exist virtually for discussions on such platforms for the purpose of entertainment, information dissemination and receipt and sometimes, for economic purposes, hence such platforms ought not be generalised as private spaces. I agree with Udems that personal Whatsapp messages between two individuals remain in the realm of private conversations but the expression of opinions or dissemination of information on Whatsapp groups should not be view with same prism. While a Scottish Court in BC and others v Chief Constable Police Service of Scotland [2018] CSOH 104, ruled that WhatsApp group chats are private, a High Court in India conversely ruled that they...

186 Years a Slave! Revocation of a Will by a Subsequent Marriage and Constitutional Right to Private and Family Life

The caption of this article was inspired by a 2013 movie (12 years a slave) where an African man who was kidnapped and sold into slavery in the US constantly struggled to regain freedom for 12 years. While enacting most Nigerian laws, we continue in our somewhat ‘slavish’ adherence to some English tenets which are incompatible with our culture and in some cases, we appear indifferent about gaining legislative freedom from some of our inherited or received English legal principles. This article focuses on how certain provisions of the ‘inherited’ and unrevised succession law in Lagos State interfere with the constitutional right to private and family life. I have not checked the Wills Laws of other States to confirm whether they have similar provisions, but section 11 of the Wills Law of Lagos State intriguingly provides that: “Every will made by a man or a woman shall be revoked by his or her marriage (other than a marriage in accordance with Customary Law) except…” This provision was imported or inherited from the English Wills Act 1837 – a period of 186 years ago. For the avoidance of doubt, section 18 of the Act provides that: “Every will made by a man or woman shall be revoked by his or her marriage…” For proper context this, this provision was enacted as a shield to protect women from the medieval English culture that automatically converted women’s properties into their husbands’ upon marriage. Dr Juliet Brook, an associate professor at the University of Reading, elaborately captures the historical reasoning behind the rule thus: “At the time of the enactment of the Wills Act 1837, the status of a woman changed fundamentally on marriage. She became a feme covert, with her property becoming that of her husband. Following her marriage, she could only make a will of personality if her husband consented to its terms, and any will of land made by a feme covert was void by statute. Due to the much-reduced property ownership rights that came with the status of being a feme covert, it was not possible for a will made prior to her marriage to continue as a valid will after the marriage and a woman’s will was therefore revoked on marriage.” (See Brook, J. Automatic revocation of a will on marriage – a rule that is past its use-by date? Private Client Business, 2024 (1). pp. 20-27). Happily, the United Kingdom is currently engaging stakeholders on the necessity to review the oppressive provision that has now become a tool of predatory marriages. (see Law commission considers wills and predatory marriage – does the law need to change? <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8df64189-bc08-4b30-8dbb-350dfae768fd) The privacy problem with section 11 of Wills Law of Lagos State Making a will is a personal affair covered by the right to private and family life under section 37 of the Nigerian Constitution. The Court of Appeal has elaborately interpreted section 37 of the Constitution in Nwali v EBSIEC (2014) LPELR-23682(CA) to cover a person’s plans, choices, desires, relationships, material possessions and family life. Hence, the plan or desire to choose whoever to bequeath one’s personal properties to, upon one’s death is a personal affair covered by the right to privacy. Privacy being a constitutional right, towers above the Wills Law enacted by the Lagos House of Assembly which tends to interfere with the enjoyment of freedom to dispose one’s properties just because the person marries under the Act. In my opinion, the provision of section 11 interferes with the right to plan one’s succession by assigning personal properties to beneficiaries of one’s choices upon  The right to private and family life inherently protects an individual’s autonomy over their personal affairs, choices and decisions. These decisions including plans relating to property, inheritance, and the disposition of one’s estate after death. Hence, a provision that allows the automatic revocation of Will by marriage undermines the testator’s autonomy. It essentially dislodges an individual’s desire to control the distribution of their estate as they please. The making of a Wills is usually informed by many reasons, one of which may be the desire to keep family members’ closely-knit by designating certain properties as family properties. Consequently, the automatic revocation provided under section 11 will force testators to rewrite their Wills upon marriage, which may not necessarily reflect their uninfluenced intentions. This is particularly instructive where someone contracts a marriage in circumstances where they do not intend to alter the provisions of their existing Will. The revocation provision forces a change to this personal and private prearrangement without the individual’s active decision, thereby violating their right to manage their personal affairs according to their wishes. The provision represents an unnecessary and for the most part, an unjustifiable intrusion by the state into a private matter, as it essentially dictates that an individual’s personal decisions regarding the distribution of assets must be modified by a life event (marriage) even if the individual does not wish to do so. This reduces the individual’s ability to make decisions about their estate in line with their desires and preferences. Conclusion The provision of section 11 that automatically revokes a Will upon marriage constitutes an unpalatable disruption of an individual’s right to private and family life. By undermining the autonomy of individuals in managing the distribution of their estates, this provision disregards personal wishes and the right to make decisions regarding one’s property without undue interference from the state through legislation. The automatic revocation forces individuals to modify their estate plans, even when they may not intend to do so, disrupting carefully considered arrangements made prior to marriage. This is the case for learned testators but in the case of the undiscerning, the consequences are worse upon their demise. While the intent behind this provision may be to protect the interests of spouses and ensure equitable distribution of assets, it fails to account for the diversity of family structures and the nuanced personal nature of estate planning. By imposing a blanket rule on subsequent (statutory) marriages, it...

Accuracy of Employees Records: Spotting some data protection issues from the facts of Ologe v Corporate Affairs Commission as decided by the National Industrial Court

Coincidentally, I penned this article today – 18 March 2025) – a day the Nigerian Bar Association Data Protection Committee (which I modestly chair) holds its inaugural webinar titled “Data Protection in Nigeria: Milking A New Practice Area” to further sensitize lawyers on why they should take issues of data protection more seriously.  In his characteristic manner, Mr. Folabi Kuti, SAN, one of the foremost labour and employment lawyers in our country had shared an interesting decision of the National Industrial Court between Olumide Abayomi Ologe and Corporate Affairs Commission & Anor. (unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/375/2024) where the court ruled on the effect of a letter of promotion which was delivered to an ex-employee two years after his resignation. Outside the labour law issues of facts and law, I spotted some quick lessons in data protection from the facts thus: The Importance of Rectifying Employee Records under the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 The Claimant resigned in December 2022, his records ought to have been rectified to reflect his status as ex-employee and his file moved to the appropriate storage section/folder whether manual or electronic. The Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (NDPA) mandates organizations to uphold the rights of individuals regarding the processing of personal data, in this case storage. One of the key rights under this Act is the right to rectification (section 34(1)(c), which allows individuals to ensure that their personal data is accurate, complete, and up-to-date. In the case of an employee who resigns, it is crucial for the employer to update the individual’s records in a timely manner. For instance, if an employee, such as the Claimant, resigns in December 2022, their employment status should be immediately reflected in both manual and electronic records. This is not just a matter of internal housekeeping; it’s a legal obligation to ensure that the employee’s status is accurately documented and that their data is properly handled. The NDPA envisions that once an employee ceases to be part of an organization, their personal data should no longer be classified as “active” in the organization’s system. The employer must ensure that the former employee’s file is moved to the appropriate storage section or folder—whether in physical archives or electronically. Failure to do so could violate the employee’s right to rectification, which could lead to legal consequences for the organization as a result on the ensuing confusion. Moving the data to the correct storage ensures the security and privacy of the ex-employee’s data while complying with the principles of data minimization and purpose limitation – these are obligations provided in the Act. Keeping outdated or incorrect employment information can not only result in potential data breaches but also exposes the organization to legal liabilities for non-compliance as well as payment of entitlements to ex-employees as claimed in Ologe’s case. It is advised that organizations must prioritize the rectification of personal data records and ensure that any data about former employees is appropriately updated, secured, and archived in accordance with the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023. This step is essential not only for legal compliance but also to protect employees privacy and data subjects rights. The Principle of Accuracy Under the NDPA: Consequences of Misleading Employment Records The NDPA provides certain principles designed for entities to ensure that personal data is handled responsibly. One of the principles is the “accuracy” principle (section 24(1)(e), which mandates that personal data must be accurate, complete, and kept up-to-date. This principle is fundamental in safeguarding individuals’ rights to have their data correctly represented, and it holds particular significance in the context of (current or past) employee records. In the case of a Claimant who resigned in December 2022, his employment status and position within the organization should have been promptly updated to reflect his actual status as an ex-employee. However, an issue arose when the employer issued a letter of promotion to the Claimant – after two years of his resignation, recognising to him as a “Director” rather than his correct position of “Principal Manager” before resignation. The employer explained its position in court, arguing that the Claimant’s last official role was that of Principal Manager and that the Claimant ought not to have countenanced the letter and its contents. This discrepancy raises concerns under the NDPA’s accuracy principle. The principle of accuracy mandates that all personal data, including employment records, must be kept precise and free from errors. Referring to an individual by a title that does not correspond to their actual position creates misleading information and violates the obligation to maintain accurate records. In this case, addressing the Claimant as a “Director” in the promotion letter, despite their last position being “Principal Manager,” represents an inaccuracy in the personal data of the Claimant, which led to the ex-employee’s demand for arrears of salaries and entitlements as a director. The error in the promotion letter also highlights a failure on the part of the employer to update and rectify the Claimant’s records in a timely manner following his resignation. According to the NDPA, an organization must ensure that any personal data held, such as job titles, is both accurate and up-to-date. Failure to amend such records can be interpreted as non-compliance with the data protection dictates. Conclusion Concluding, the failure to correct the Claimant’s employment records, particularly in addressing him as a “Director” in a letter written in January 2024 – two years after his resignation, is misleading as it constitutes a clear violation of the rectification and accuracy principles under the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023. The Act mandates that personal data must be accurate, complete, and kept up-to-date, especially when an individual’s employment status changes. By continuing to refer to the Claimant by an incorrect job title, the employer has not only breached the legal obligation to rectify and maintain accurate records but has also undermined the integrity of the data processing practices. It is crucial for organizations to prioritize timely updates and ensure that all personal data, including employment titles and statuses,...

Employment of Supernumerary Policemen: Supreme Court’s decision in Mobil Unlimited v Okon Johnson & Ors. 

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Data Protection and Privacy Challenges in Nigeria (Legal Issues)

We aim to lead in each practice and area of law we work in. Coming from in-depth understanding of the law and the industry, capitalizing on extensive experience, we provide hands-on advice that speaks the language of our client’s business. Whether in aviation, sales and distribution, antitrust, corporate and M&A, finance, employment, energy, IP, litigation, TMT, real estate, or any other area of law, our clients can expect excellence and commitment to their objectives. Ensuring the operational functioning of the organisation, the development of external relations, management of press relations and constant communication with the press.

Building Inclusive local Internet Governance Initiative through Education.

We aim to lead in each practice and area of law we work in. Coming from in-depth understanding of the law and the industry, capitalizing on extensive experience, we provide hands-on advice that speaks the language of our client’s business. Whether in aviation, sales and distribution, antitrust, corporate and M&A, finance, employment, energy, IP, litigation, TMT, real estate, or any other area of law, our clients can expect excellence and commitment to their objectives. Ensuring the operational functioning of the organisation, the development of external relations, management of press relations and constant communication with the press.

S.P.D.C. v Erefamayo Fibika (2015) All FWLR (Pt. 777) 775 @ 793

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